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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) origin and performance 
consequences in a New Zealand (NZ) setting. The NZ setting is unique because previous research on 
this topic is from the United States (US) and in one instance the United Kingdom (UK); and the NZ 
setting is intriguing because it has four important institutional differences: NZ directors hire 
outsiders much more frequently than their US and UK counterparts; NZ has no discernible trend in 
the frequency of outsider appointments over time, whereas the US has a marked upward trend; 
average CEO tenure in NZ is much shorter than that observed in the US or globally; and CEO 
succession occurs in relatively small firms. These four differences suggest that the NZ CEO market 
has some unique dynamics and perhaps unique performance consequences. This thesis fills a gap in 
our knowledge of executive and director practice in NZ and contributes to the CEO origin debate by 
analysing a new setting.  
 
Using a hand collected sample of 162 CEO appointments from NZ firms between 1991 and 2008, I 
find some significant performance differences between insider and outsider CEOs. Outsiders elicit a 
higher abnormal return around the appointment announcement: the 1-day and the 3-day 
differentials are approximately 1.2% and 1.7% respectively. In contrast, insiders create more 
shareholder wealth during their first three years in charge: insiders increase the appointing firm’s 
market-to-book ratio by approximately 27 percentage points more than outsiders. I also discover 
that insiders are around 37 percentage points more likely to last at least three years in the job. The 
main difference between these findings and those from the US and UK is that insiders easily 
outperform outsiders in the medium term. Also, I document an intuitive finding for grey insiders: 
grey insiders by definition possess a blend of insider and outsider attributes and perform between 
insiders and outsiders on all three performance measures. These findings are robust to various 
controls and subsamples, and there is also some evidence that the market-to-book finding is robust 
to selection bias. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Selecting a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is one of the most important decisions faced by the board 
of directors. This decision is important because CEOs significantly affect firm policy, firm 
performance, and shareholder wealth (e.g., Bennedsen, Pérez-González, & Wolfenzon, 2010, 2012; 
Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004; Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011). In 
making this decision, the directors must carefully evaluate the skills and abilities of the candidates, 
predict the future needs of the firm, and then determine who is most likely to create shareholder 
wealth. 
 
One important component of the hiring decision revolves around CEO origin: does the optimal 
candidate come from within the firm (an insider) or from outside the firm (an outsider)? The answer 
to this question may not be obvious because each candidate type has different strengths. On the 
one hand, insiders know the firm’s products, markets, and employees so can quickly and smoothly 
pick up the responsibilities of the CEO (Bidwell, 2011). Insiders have worked for the firm so the 
board knows how they performed in prior roles, how effectively they work with colleagues, and how 
they fit the company culture. In other words, insiders are known quantities, whereas outsiders 
present the board with uncertainty (Hermalin, 2005). An insider appointment also motivates other 
employees to work hard as they know internal promotion is possible (Chan, 1996).  
 
On the other hand, outsiders have worked for other firms so are likely to have wider work 
experience, allowing them to gather more generic skills than insiders (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2006). For 
example, some outsiders may have been CEOs and therefore have CEO specific skills, such as 
deciding on strategy, communicating with the press, and obtaining capital from investors. Outsiders 
can also catalyse change in the firm (Helmich & Brown, 1972; Vancil, 1987; Wiersema, 1992). 
Outsiders can objectively evaluate the status quo, for example, because they have not worked for 
the appointing firm and therefore are not attached to firm policies or employees. They may also 
have fresh ideas and management strategies from their experience at other firms. 
 
Several studies investigate whether directors should systematically favour one CEO origin over 
another. These studies compare the performance of appointed insiders and appointed outsiders, 
and generally measure performance along three dimensions: the abnormal return around the 
appointment announcement, medium term firm performance, and the likelihood of the CEO lasting 
at least three years in the job. These studies report mixed findings: outsiders are generally 
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associated with higher abnormal returns around the appointment announcement (e.g., Adams & 
Mansi, 2009; Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 2012); neither insiders nor 
outsiders consistently dominate over the medium term (e.g., Ang & Nagel, 2009; Falato & 
Kadyrzhanova, 2012; Huson et al., 2004); and insiders are sometimes more likely to last three years 
in the job (e.g., Allgood & Farrell, 2003; Zhang, 2008). These studies all use CEO appointments from 
the United States (US), except Dahya and McConnell who use CEO appointments from the United 
Kingdom (UK).  
 
In this thesis, I also compare the performance of insiders and outsiders. However, in contrast to 
previous studies, I use a hand collected sample of 162 CEO appointments from New Zealand (NZ) 
firms between 1991 and 2008. The NZ setting is intriguing because it has important institutional 
differences. Firstly, NZ directors hire outsiders much more frequently than their overseas 
counterparts: just over 50% of NZ CEOs are outsiders, whereas 30% of UK CEOs and between 30 and 
40% of US CEOs are outsiders (Ang & Nagel, 2009; Citrin, Smith, & Speed, 2011; Dahya & McConnell, 
2005; Falato, Li, & Milbourn, 2009; Kuang, Qin, & Wielhouwer, 2012). Secondly, NZ has no 
discernible trend in the frequency of outsider appointments over time, whereas the US has a marked 
upward trend (Falato et al., 2009). Thirdly, average CEO tenure in NZ is much shorter than that 
observed overseas: the mean (median) tenure of NZ CEOs is approximately 4.5 years (3.5 years), 
whereas the mean of global and the median of US CEOs is approximately 7.7 years (Falato et al., 
2009; Lucier, Habbel, & Wheeler, 2007). Finally, a NZ setting allows me to study CEO successions in 
relatively small firms. I meet the call of Giambatista, Rowe, and Riaz (2005), who review the CEO 
succession literature and recommend the following for future research: 
 
As to setting, we would like to see more variety in industry settings and a more 
inclusive approach accommodating smaller and mid-size firms. Because the 
traumatic effects of succession are likely to be even more pronounced in small and 
medium-sized firms (Levinthal, 1991), the need for knowledge of succession in 
these settings is even more urgent. (p. 986)  
 
These four differences suggest that the NZ CEO market has some unique dynamics and perhaps 
unique performance consequences; the findings of the US and UK studies may not generalise to NZ. 
This thesis fills a gap in our knowledge of executive and director practice in NZ. 
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This thesis also improves on previous work in two ways. First, I refine the CEO origin classification: I 
introduce a third origin, grey insider, for those CEOs who are not clear insiders or outsiders. Grey 
insiders make up 23% of this thesis’s sample and include the following groups: recently hired 
executives, former executives, non-executive directors, and executives or non-executive directors of 
the major shareholder of the appointing firm. Previous studies do not explicitly mention how they 
classify the final three groups; instead they often state something like “insiders have been with the 
firm for at least a year”, but do not stipulate whether “been with” refers only to current executives 
or also includes these groups (e.g., Agrawal, Knoeber, & Tsoulouhas, 2006; Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 
2012; Huson et al., 2004). I clear up this ambiguity by classifying these groups as grey insiders. The 
grey insider category sharpens the distinction between insider and outsider. 
 
Second, I use a more comprehensive and holistic criteria for comparing the performance of CEOs 
from different origins. Each of the US and UK studies only analyse performance along one or two 
dimensions, whereas this thesis uses three dimensions: (i) the share price reaction to the 
appointment announcement, (ii) the 3-year change in the firm’s market-to-book ratio, and (iii) the 
likelihood of the CEO lasting at least three years. Each dimension captures performance from a 
different angle: (i) shows who investors expect to have a greater impact on the firm, (ii) shows who 
actually has a greater impact on the firm, and (iii) shows who is more likely to be a good match with 
the firm.  
 
Using these performance measures, I find the following performance differences between insiders 
and outsiders. Outsiders elicit a higher abnormal return around the appointment announcement: 
the 1-day and the 3-day differentials are approximately 1.2% and 1.7% respectively. In contrast, 
insiders create more shareholder wealth over a three year period: insiders increase the appointing 
firm’s market-to-book ratio by approximately 27 percentage points more than outsiders. I also find 
that insiders are around 37 percentage points more likely to last at least three years in the job. The 
main difference between these findings and those from the US and UK is that insiders easily 
outperform outsiders in the medium term. I also discover an intuitive finding for grey insiders: grey 
insiders by definition possess a blend of insider and outsider attributes and interestingly perform 
between insiders and outsiders on all three measures. These findings are robust to various controls 
and subsamples, and there is also some evidence that the market-to-book finding is robust to 
selection bias.   
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The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter, I review the literature on CEO 
origin and performance consequences. Chapter 3 describes the sample selection, the CEO origin 
classification, and the sample statistics. In Chapters 4 through 6, I compare the performance of 
insiders, grey insiders, and outsiders. Chapter 7 offers some possible explanations for the findings 
and contains concluding remarks. 
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2 Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I review studies that compare the performance of insiders and outsiders. I present 
their findings in the order of this thesis’s performance measures: the abnormal return around the 
appointment announcement, medium term firm performance, and the likelihood of the CEO lasting 
at least three years in the job.  
 
2.1  Appointment Announcement Abnormal Returns  
 
Outsiders, on average, elicit a higher abnormal return around the appointment announcement. For 
example, Adams and Mansi (2009) analyse 674 CEO appointments from the US between 1973 and 
2000, and find that outsiders deliver a 3-day abnormal return that is 2.3% higher than insiders, a 
difference which is significant at the 1% level. After controlling for other factors, the authors find 
that the difference shrinks to 1.4% and is significant at the 5% level.   
 
Two more recent studies also report similar results. Dahya and McConnell (2005) study 523 CEO 
appointments from the UK between 1989 and 1999, and observe that outsiders generate a 2-day 
abnormal return that is 0.6% higher than insiders, a difference which is significant at the 1% level. 
After controlling for the likelihood of an outsider appointment, Dahya and McConnell discover that 
the difference and significance slightly diminish. Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2012) examine 1,665 CEO 
successions from the US financial sector between 1988 and 2007 and also find that outsiders elicit 
higher abnormal returns than insiders: a difference in 2-day abnormal returns of 1.8% which is 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
The evidence from earlier studies is mixed. Lubatkin, Chung, Rogers, and Owers (1989) analyse 477 
CEO appointments from large US firms between 1971 and 1985. After controlling for firm size and 
prior firm performance, the authors discover that outsiders are associated with significantly higher 
2-day abnormal returns. Bonnier and Bruner (1989) and Friedman and Singh (1989) find that 
outsiders are associated with insignificantly higher abnormal returns. Bonnier and Bruner examine 
87 top management changes from financially distressed US firms between 1969 and 1983, and 
Friedman and Singh examine 130 CEO changes from large US firms. Both studies control for other 
factors. By contrast, using 323 top management changes from US firms between 1975 and 1982, 
Furtado and Rozeff (1987) find that insiders elicit higher abnormal returns: the difference in 2-day 
abnormal returns is 1.73% and is significant at the 1% level. This finding, however, only applies to 
6 
 
their large firm subsample; in their small firm subsample, the difference is approximately 0% and is 
statistically insignificant.           
 
 2.2  Medium Term Firm Performance 
 
Consistent with their above finding, Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2012) discover that outsiders also 
perform best over the medium term. They use a four-factor market model to calculate 3-year 
abnormal returns, and report the following findings: insiders have an implied 1-year abnormal return 
of 4.4% which is not statistically significant, while outsiders have an implied 1-year abnormal return 
of 8.0% which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The authors, however, do not mention 
whether the difference is statistically significant. Falato and Kadyrzhanova also analyse 3-year 
changes in the firm’s operating performance and Tobin’s q. They control for the firm’s industry and 
prior performance, and conclude that the performance gap between insiders and outsiders ranges 
“from 25 to 50 percent of the pre-transition unadjusted level of performance” (p.17). These findings 
are statistically significant at the 5% or 10% levels. As a robustness check, the authors use a nearest-
neighbour matching estimator to control for selection issues; they continue to find a large 
performance gap favouring outsiders.  
 
Lauterbach, Vu, and Weisberg (1999) study 165 top management successions in US firms between 
1989 and 1991 and report similar findings. Using a market model to calculate 2-year abnormal 
returns, they discover that the returns associated with outsiders are 24 percentage points higher 
than those associated with insiders, a difference which is significant at the 5% level. The authors also 
control for several other factors using a cross-sectional regression, and find that the difference 
widens to 38 percentage points and becomes significant at the 1% level.   
 
Huson et al. (2004) also report some evidence in favour of outsiders. They scrutinise 1,344 CEO 
successions from large US public firms between 1971 and 1994, and find that outsiders are 
associated with higher mean and median 3-year changes in operating return on assets (OROA). 
These bivariate differences are significant at the 1% level when unadjusted and industry-adjusted 
OROA are used as performance measures, but the significance diminishes when control-group-
adjusted OROA is used. The control groups consist of firms from the same industry that have similar 
prior performance. The authors also control for several other factors using a cross-sectional 
regression, and find no significant performance differences between insiders and outsiders.             
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In contrast, Ang and Nagel (2009) document some evidence in favour of insiders. They analyse over 
3,000 CEO appointments from large US companies between 1986 and 2005, and conclude that 
insiders, on average, deliver at least 25% greater accounting performance. However, they find no 
difference when Tobin’s q and stock returns are used as performance measures. Ang and Nagel 
control for other factors via regression techniques and control for selection issues via a treatment 
effects model and matching methods. Using matching methods, the authors also find that insiders 
are associated with less chance of poor performance and with equal chance of highest performance. 
Ang and Nagel then compare the performance of insiders and outsiders in 10 hiring circumstances 
where conventional wisdom suggests that outsiders should excel. These circumstances include 
turning the firm around, restructuring the firm, managing very large firms, extracting merger 
premiums, and cases involving firms with potentially inferior insider candidates.  Surprisingly, they 
find that insiders either excel or deliver comparable performance in these circumstances.        
 
Khurana (2002a) also provides support for insiders. After analysing the hiring and firing of CEOs at 
850 of America’s largest companies between 1978 and 1999, and after conducting extensive 
interviews with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms, Khurana 
argues that directors systematically overestimate the ability of outsider candidates. Specifically, he 
argues that directors are irrationally attracted to “superstars” - outsider candidates who are 
charismatic and come from high performing and high stature companies. The irrational quest for 
superstars causes directors to overlook superior insider candidates, whose experience and abilities 
are better suited to the appointing firm. The mismatch between the superstar’s skills and the firm’s 
needs results in poor firm performance. Khurana (2002b) concludes that “[t]ime and again over the 
past 20 years, corporate boards have seen the superstars they had hoped would be saviors turn into 
black holes that sucked the energy and purpose out of their organizations” (p. 66). 
 
2.3  Lasting at Least Three Years in the Job 
 
The evidence on balance suggests that insiders are more likely to last at least three years in the job. 
For example, Zhang (2008) analyses 204 CEO successions from US non-diversified manufacturing 
firms, and finds that outsiders have a significantly higher probability of being dismissed within their 
first three years. She uses discrete-time event history models and controls for several other factors 
including alternative reasons for leaving the firm. Zhang concludes that directors are more likely to 
make mistakes when appointing outsiders as they know less about outsider candidates than insider 
candidates.  
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Bidwell (2011) supports the conclusions of Zhang (2008). Bidwell studies employee appointments 
from a US investment banking firm between 2006 and 2009 and, after controlling for several job and 
employee specific factors, documents that outsiders have significantly higher voluntary and 
involuntary departure rates in their first two years. Specifically, he uses Cox event history models 
and finds that outside hires have a 61% higher hazard rate of involuntary exit than simple inside 
promotions, and a 21% higher hazard rate of voluntary exit. Bidwell offers two explanations for 
these findings: outsiders perform significantly worse in their early years which results in more exits; 
and outsiders and employers are less acquainted which results in more bad matches and hence 
exits.  
 
Allgood and Farrell (2003) provide limited support for insiders. They examine 392 CEO successions 
from US firms between 1981 and 1993, and report that 81% of insiders and 70% of outsiders last at 
least three years in the job. The authors, however, do not mention whether the difference is 
statistically significant. Allgood and Farrell also estimate multinomial logit regressions that control 
for firm size, firm prior performance, firm current performance, previous CEO departure variables, 
and current CEO age. The authors find no significant difference in the likelihood of insiders and 
outsiders lasting at least three years.  
 
2.4  Summary 
 
In summary, the empirical evidence on CEO origin and performance consequences is mixed: 
outsiders are generally associated with higher abnormal returns around the appointment 
announcement; neither insiders nor outsiders consistently dominate over the medium term; and 
insiders are sometimes more likely to last three years in the job. These findings are exclusively from 
the US and in one instance the UK. 
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3 Sample Selection and CEO Origin  
 
In this chapter, I describe the sample selection, the CEO origin classification, and the sample 
statistics. 
  
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
When a company appoints a CEO it informs investors via a New Zealand Exchange (NZX) 
announcement. I search for these appointment announcements in the NZX i-Search database, a 
database that contains all announcements from NZX listed firms over the last 23 years.1 To find CEO 
appointment announcements within this database, I use the advanced search function, inputting the 
following search parameters: 
 Announcement types. NZX announcements are categorised into types based on their 
content. After experimenting with different announcement types, I discover that the 
appointment announcements are generally ‘office’, ‘director’, or ‘general’ types.  
 Keywords. Several different keywords are used: ‘appointment’, ‘CEO’, ‘chief executive 
officer’, and ‘managing director’. The database searches for these keywords in the 
announcement title and in the announcement itself. 
 Time period. The announcement must be released between 30 August 1991 and 31 
December 2008. This period maximises sample size whilst adhering to the data constraints: 
30 August 1991 is the earliest date in the database, and 31 December 2008 is the latest date 
(as at the time of searching) that allows the 3-year performance measures to be observed. 
I run 12 different searches in total; I try all three announcement types for each keyword - an 
announcement type and a keyword are both needed to avoid being overwhelmed by irrelevant 
search results.2 Using the above parameters, a search returns approximately between 90 and 1200 
                                                             
1 With a subscription, the database is available from https://www.i-search.nzx.com. Instead of searching for 
appointment announcements, I could have identified today’s CEOs of NZX firms and then traced back their 
appointments. However, this method is more time intensive and would not include non-current CEOs or CEOs 
of firms that have subsequently delisted. 
2
 A few additional appointments are found with the following strategy. If a CEO leaves the company and the 
subsequent CEO appointment does not appear in the 12 different searches, then I read through the company’s 
announcements until I find the subsequent appointment, which is usually buried within an earnings 
announcement. 
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results. Approximately 10% of these results actually contain a CEO appointment announcement; 
however, the same appointment announcement often appears in multiple searches.  
 
As I read through the search results, I only keep permanent CEO appointments. Interim 
appointments are discarded because their medium term performance consequences cannot be 
measured. The appointment announcement usually mentions whether the appointment is 
permanent or interim, and when it is unclear, I read the firm’s annual report for the financial year of 
the appointment.3 
 
After the above searching, I have an initial sample of 213 CEO appointments. Each of these 
appointments must then satisfy five conditions:         
(i) The appointed CEO must be the sole top executive. In other words, an Executive Chairman, 
Managing Director, or Joint CEO cannot also be present at the appointing firm.4 This 
condition ensures that the CEO’s influence on the firm is significant and can be isolated. I use 
annual reports to check for unconventional management structures. This condition removes 
10 CEO appointments from the sample. 
(ii) The appointment must involve a new CEO. In other words, the appointment cannot be a 
mere formality with the incumbent CEO being re-appointed to his existing firm - for 
example, the CEO of the acquiring firm in a merger being appointed to CEO of the merged 
firm. This condition ensures that both insiders and outsiders are new to the appointing 
firm’s CEO position and hence compete on a level playing field. The appointment 
announcement usually states whether the appointment involves a new CEO or an 
incumbent, and when it is unclear, I read the firm’s annual report for the financial year of 
the appointment. This condition removes three CEO appointments from the sample.  
(iii) The appointing firm must be listed on the NZX Main Board or the NZX Alternative Market 
(NZAX) at the time of the announcement. Put differently, the firm’s equity (instead of only 
its debt) needs to be publically traded. This condition is necessary as two of the CEO 
                                                             
3 Annual reports are available from the NZX Company Research database or the University of Canterbury 
Library. With a subscription, the NZX Company Research database is available from 
http://companyresearch.nzx.com. The NZX Company Research database does not have annual reports for 
eight firms so I borrow them from the University of Canterbury Library.  
4
 One appointment violates this condition. Despite an Executive Chairman being present, I include the CEO 
appointment because the annual reports imply that the CEO is actually running the firm. Also, one 
appointment is excluded as the board does not select the CEO; a property trust sold their management rights 
to a third party, who allocated an employee to manage the trust.  
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performance measures require share prices. When it is not obvious whether the company 
has listed equity, I check the Listed Securities section within the Profile Search Tool function 
of the NZX Company Research database. This condition removes six CEO appointments from 
the sample.     
(iv) The appointing firm must be domiciled in NZ at the time of the appointment announcement 
and for the following three years. This condition ensures that country-specific factors will 
not bias performance comparisons. I check the firm’s domiciliation using registered company 
addresses at the back of annual reports. This condition removes 27 CEO appointments from 
the sample. 
(v) There must be sufficient information to classify the origin of the appointed CEO. I discuss 
this classification in the next section. This condition removes five CEO appointments from 
the sample.  
After the above filtering, I have a final sample of 162 CEO appointments. 
 
3.2 CEO Origin Classification 
 
I classify each appointed CEO as an insider, grey insider, or outsider: 
 Immediately prior to the appointment, insiders are executives of the appointing firm and 
have worked at the firm for at least a year. The 1-year requirement is common in the finance 
literature (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Ang & Nagel, 2009; Cazier & McInnis, 2010; Falato & 
Kadyrzhanova, 2012; Huson et al., 2004). The rationale is that after a year’s experience an 
executive is more like an insider than an outsider.   
 Grey insiders are any of the following: 
(a) Immediately prior to the appointment, executives of the appointing firm who have 
worked at the firm for less than a year (i.e., recently hired executives).5 Previous 
studies classify these executives as outsiders (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Ang & Nagel, 
2009; Cazier & McInnis, 2010; Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 2012; Huson et al., 2004). I 
deem it more appropriate, however, to classify them as grey insiders as they have 
spent some time inside the firm.  
(b) Immediately prior to the appointment, executives of another firm who have worked 
at the appointing firm at some stage during the five years leading up to the 
appointment (i.e., former executives). I use a 5-year cut-off so that I can accurately 
                                                             
5 I also classify two consultants (instead of executives) as grey insiders. Both consultants worked for the 
appointing firm for several months prior to becoming CEO.  
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classify these executives: an executive’s early work history is often unavailable. Also, 
a 5-year cut-off ensures a significant link between the former executive and the 
appointing firm.  
(c) Non-executive directors of the appointing firm who served at some stage during the 
five years leading up to the appointment.  
(d) Executives or non-executive directors of a major shareholder of the appointing firm.6 
These candidates must have held these positions immediately prior to the 
appointment, so that they have a significant link with the appointing firm. A major 
shareholder is defined as owning at least 40% of the appointing firm at the time of 
the appointment announcement. 
The grey insider classification is unique to this thesis. Previous studies do not explicitly 
mention how they classify groups (b) through (d); instead they often state something like 
“insiders have been with the firm for at least a year”, but do not stipulate whether “been 
with” refers only to current executives or also includes groups (b) through (d) (e.g., Agrawal 
et al., 2006; Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 2012; Huson et al., 2004). I clear up this ambiguity by 
classifying these groups as grey insiders. Grey insiders are not clear insiders or outsiders; 
they are more connected to the firm than outsiders, but not as intimately as insiders; they 
possess a blend of insider and outsider attributes. A grey insider category sharpens the 
distinction between insider and outsider.  
 Outsiders make up the rest of the sample: they have no obvious and/or recent connection 
with the appointing firm.   
 
I use several information sources to classify the appointed CEOs. In about 50% of cases, the NZX 
appointment announcement contains sufficient information. Such announcements are usually from 
the 2000s and provide detailed background information on the appointed CEO (e.g., firm tenure, 
previous employers, and other connections to the firm). In approximately 40% of cases, I obtain the 
necessary information from the firm’s annual report covering the year of the appointment: annual 
reports often contain a profile of the appointed CEO or a discussion about the appointment. Annual 
report information also allows me to confirm that the appointed CEO’s previous firm is not a major 
shareholder: the breakdown of shareholders is required information in NZ annual reports. In the 
                                                             
6
 One appointed CEO violates this condition: he is classified an insider rather than a grey insider. The CEO’s 
background is as follows: after nine years as an executive at the appointing firm, he moves to the major 
shareholder, but returns after only nine months to become CEO. Given the nine years with the appointing firm, 
he is deemed an insider rather than a grey insider.  
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remaining 10% of appointments, I search Factiva, Google, and LinkedIn and these sources usually 
yield a relevant news article or career biography.7 Finally, for all appointed CEOs that appear to be 
outsiders, I search the firm’s directorship history on the NZ Companies Office website to check that 
none are past non-executive directors of the appointing firm.8  
 
3.3 Sample Statistics 
  
The 162 CEO appointments come from 102 different firms: 61 firms have 1 CEO appointment, 28 
have 2, 9 have 3, 3 have 4, and 1 has 6. At the time of their respective appointment 
announcement(s), 95 of the firms are listed on the NZX Main Board and 7 on the NZX Alternative 
Market. There are 157 different CEOs; 5 of them have been appointed to 2 firms.   
 
Figure 3.1 shows the 162 appointed CEOs by origin: 42 (26%) are insiders, 38 (23%) are grey insiders, 
and 82 (51%) are outsiders. Outsiders dominate the sample and are more common in NZ than 
overseas. For example, over a comparable sample period, 30% of UK CEOs and between 30 and 40% 
of US CEOs are outsiders (Ang & Nagel, 2009; Citrin et al., 2011; Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Falato et 
al., 2009; Kuang et al., 2012). Furthermore, these overseas proportions are inflated as their authors 
classify some grey insiders as outsiders.   
 
Figure 3.1: Appointments by CEO Origin 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 With a subscription, Factiva is available from www.dowjones.com/factiva/. With a free membership, LinkedIn 
is available from http://nz.linkedin.com/. 
8 The NZ Companies Office website is http://www.business.govt.nz/companies.      
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Even though grey insiders are unique to this thesis, there is some evidence that they are more 
popular in NZ than abroad. The two closest studies, Citrin et al. (2011) and Citrin and Ogden (2010), 
analyse three additional CEO types: insider-outsiders who are brought into the company as second 
in charge and are then promoted to CEO within 18 months; former executives who spent time away 
from the firm and returned to become CEO; and non-executive directors who are appointed CEO. 
The two studies examine CEO appointments between 2004 and 2008 in the UK and US respectively 
and find that these three additional CEO types make up 10% and 13% of their respective samples. 
These three additional CEO types are similar to the grey insider groups (a), (b), and (c), which 
together make up 16% of this thesis’s sample. This comparison is rough, however, because the 
overseas studies use a different sample period and use slightly different CEO classification 
definitions.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the breakdown of grey insiders into groups (a) through to (d): 18% of grey insiders 
are recently hired executives, 5% are former executives, 18% are non-executive directors, 34% are 
from the major shareholder, and 24% have multiple connections (e.g., a former executive who is also 
a non-executive director). 
 
Figure 3.2: Breakdown of Grey Insiders 
  
 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the variation of CEO appointments across time.9 The appointments average nine 
per year, but are more common in the later part of the sample period - 54% of the appointments 
occur in the last six years. This increased appointment frequency may be driven by three factors. 
                                                             
9 Figure 3.3 uses the appointment announcement date rather than the CEO’s first day on the job.  
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First, over a comparable sample period, average CEO tenure has significantly decreased in the US 
(Kaplan & Minton, 2012). If this trend is also present in NZ, then it would contribute to more CEO 
appointments in recent years. Second, I suspect that the total number of firms listed on the NZX 
Mainboard and NZX Alternative Market has increased over time, which would lead to more CEO 
appointments.10 Third, the sample selection may be biased, for some unknown reason, towards 
finding appointments in recent years. 
 
Figure 3.3:  Appointments across Time 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: CEO Origin across Time 
 
 
 
                                                             
10 Figures to support this claim are not readily available. The NZX could provide such figures, but at a cost of 
$500 or more. 
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the variation of CEO origin across time. As a proportion of appointments in 
a year, none of the CEO origins have a discernible pattern: insiders dominate in 1996, but since then 
they average only 26% of appointments; grey insiders average 31% of appointments between 1992 
and 2002, but since then have become less common; and outsiders dominate the early 1990s, 1998, 
and the late 2000s. A lack of a trend is in contrast to US data, which has seen the popularity of 
outsiders increase over a comparable sample period (e.g., Falato et al., 2009). Table 3.1 provides a 
more detailed breakdown of the data used in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. 
 
Table 3.1: Appointments across Time 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the CEO appointments over time. The table uses the year of the 
appointment announcement rather than the year of the CEO’s first day on the job. Each CEO appointment is 
permanent and needs to satisfy five conditions to be included in the sample (see section 3.1). Each 
appointment is classified as an insider, grey insider, or outsider (see section 3.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Insider Grey Insider Outsider Total Insider % Grey Insider % Outsider %
1991 0 0 0 0 - - -
1992 0 1 1 2 0% 50% 50%
1993 0 1 2 3 0% 33% 67%
1994 1 1 5 7 14% 14% 71%
1995 1 2 4 7 14% 29% 57%
1996 3 0 1 4 75% 0% 25%
1997 2 2 3 7 29% 29% 43%
1998 0 1 5 6 0% 17% 83%
1999 4 4 2 10 40% 40% 20%
2000 2 4 3 9 22% 44% 33%
2001 2 4 6 12 17% 33% 50%
2002 2 4 1 7 29% 57% 14%
2003 2 3 8 13 15% 23% 62%
2004 5 2 3 10 50% 20% 30%
2005 7 1 7 15 47% 7% 47%
2006 7 3 9 19 37% 16% 47%
2007 1 3 12 16 6% 19% 75%
2008 3 2 10 15 20% 13% 67%
Total 42 38 82 162 - - -
Average 2 2 5 9 24% 26% 49%
Median 2 2 4 8 20% 23% 50%
Range 7 4 12 19 75% 57% 69%
% of Appointments in a YearNumber of Appointments
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4 Appointment Announcement Abnormal Returns  
  
In this chapter, I compare the appointment announcement abnormal returns of insiders, grey 
insiders, and outsiders. Before making this comparison, I explain the rationale and measurement of 
these returns, and outline the sample selection for the event study. 
 
4.1 Rationale and Measurement  
  
The abnormal returns around the CEO’s appointment announcement are the first performance 
measure. As documented in Chapter 2, these abnormal returns are commonly used to gauge 
expected CEO performance. They show who investors expect to have a greater impact on firm 
prospects: investors react to the appointment news by immediately buying or selling shares, pushing 
share prices up or down, depending on whether they expect the CEO to improve or worsen firm 
prospects. In other words, the abnormal returns capture the expected impact of the CEO on firm 
cash flows and/or on firm systematic risk - a lower cost of capital leads to a higher contemporaneous 
share price. If investors’ expectations are correct on average, then the abnormal returns provide an 
unbiased estimate of the CEO’s impact; the abnormal returns are measured over a short period so 
confounding factors are less of a concern. Even if investor expectations are wrong, the abnormal 
returns still show which CEO origin is generally best for shareholders in the immediate term.  
 
To estimate expected returns, I use a trade-to-trade model. When shares do not trade daily - as is 
the case for some NZX listed shares - a daily return model compares nonsynchronous firm and 
market returns, and this biases the beta estimates (Maynes & Rumsey, 1993). A trade-to-trade 
model avoids this problem by comparing synchronous returns - both firm and market returns are 
measured over the firm’s trade-to-trade period, a period that starts and finishes on the stock’s two 
adjacent positive volume trading days. Two studies find that the trade-to-trade model is superior to 
other thin trading adjustments (Bartholdy, Olson, & Peare, 2007; Maynes & Rumsey, 1993), and 
several studies use this model (e.g., Bailey, Karolyi, & Salva, 2006; Marsden, 2000; Marsden, Poskitt, 
& Wang, 2008; Sponholtz, 2008).     
 
Borrowing from Maynes and Rumsey (1993), I calculate firm j returns over a trade-to-trade period of 
(t – n) to t, in which no trades occur in the (n – 1) intervening days:  
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                                                          (
    
       
)                                                  ( 4.1 ) 
 
where      is firm j’s share price (adjusted for corporate actions and dividends) on day t. The 
corresponding market returns are calculated over a matching trade-to-trade period: 
 
                                                      (
    
       
)                                                 ( 4.2 ) 
 
where       is the market’s price (adjusted for dividends) on day t. Market prices are from the NZX 
All index, which consists of the majority of NZX Main Board companies.11 I choose this index because 
it is the only broad NZ index with data back to 1991. (4.1) and (4.2) are computed over an estimation 
period of -210 to -11 days (where 0 is the day of the appointment announcement). Details on the 
collection of the firm and NZX All data are provided in Appendix A.3.  
 
The market model and the above trade-to-trade returns form the trade-to-trade model: 
 
                                                   ∑       
    
                                  ( 4.3 ) 
 
where    is equal to 1 plus the number of zero volume trading days between t and (t - n). For 
example, the    for Thursday equals 3 if the stock trades on Monday and Thursday but not on 
Tuesday or Wednesday. The error term in (4.3) is heteroskedastic with variance equal to     
 , and 
this causes inefficient estimation of    and   . To solve this problem, (4.3) is divided by √  : 
 
                                 
    
√  
    √     
    
√  
                                                 ( 4.4 ) 
 
As the error term in (4.4) is homoscedastic with mean equal to 0, I estimate (4.4) using ordinary least 
squares (OLS), i.e., I regress 
    
√  
 on 
    
√  
 and √  , and suppress the default intercept term.  
 
I record the regression outputs,  ̂  and  ̂ , and present their summary statistics in Table 4.1. The 
average firm has a beta of around 0.5 and an alpha that is close to 0. Table 4.1 also shows that the 
                                                             
11 For the methodology of the NZX All index, please see p. 33 - 35 of 
 https://www.nzx.com/files/static/Equity_Indices_Methodology_June_2012.pdf. 
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mean (median) number of trading days used in the estimation period is 177 (197). The minimum 
number of trading days is 32, which is just above the minimum sample selection cut-off of 30 days 
(as outlined in section 4.2 below).   
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of  ̂and ̂  
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics of the trade-to-trade model parameters and of the number of 
trading days used in the estimation period. The trade-to-trade model uses the market model and trade-to-
trade returns from an estimation period of -210 to -11 days. 
 Mean Median Stdev Minimum Maximum 
 ̂  -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0020 -0.0081 0.0048 
 ̂  0.56 0.50 0.65 -2.35 4.26 
# of Trading Days 177 197 36 32 200 
 
Expected returns are therefore: 
 
 [
    
√  
]    ̂ √    ̂ 
    
√  
                                                
 
and abnormal returns are:  
 
      
    
√  
  [
    
√  
]                                              
 
I report two event windows for the abnormal returns: (a) the day of the appointment announcement 
and (b) the three days centred on the announcement. Event window (a) uses the day 0 trade-to-
trade abnormal return; event window (b) uses the 3-day cumulative abnormal return, calculated as 
the sum of the day -1, day 0, and day +1 trade-to-trade abnormal returns. If the stock does not trade 
on one or two of the days in (b) - but does trade on day 0 or day +1 - then a sum is taken where the 
no-trade days are treated as zero percent return days. 
 
4.2 Sample Selection  
 
For each event window, I start with the 162 CEO appointments and sequentially put each 
appointment through the following criteria:  
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(i) There must be a trade in the event window so that an abnormal return can be measured. 
Furthermore, a trade must occur on day 0 or day +1 in the 3-day window, ensuring that 
investors can react to the appointment announcement. This criterion is implemented by 
checking the stock’s volume during the event windows. This criterion reduces the 1-day 
event window sample by 23 appointments and the 3-day by 15 appointments.       
(ii) The stock must trade at least 30 times between day -210 and day -11 so that  ̂  and  ̂  can 
be measured accurately. This criterion is implemented by counting the number of days with 
positive stock volume between day -210 and day -11. This criterion further reduces the 1-
day event window sample by three appointments and the 3-day by eight appointments.   
(iii) There must be no ‘obvious’ confounding announcements in the event window so that the 
appointment announcement effect can be isolated. ‘Obvious’ includes the following 
announcements: earnings results or updates, significant project updates, mergers, or 
movements in significant substantial shareholders. These announcements have been shown 
to create significant abnormal returns in their own right (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). I check 
for ‘obvious’ confounding news in the appointment announcement and in other 
announcements released by the company within the respective event windows.12 To do the 
latter, I input the stock’s ticker and event window dates into the Announcements Search 
Tool section of the NZX Company Research database. This criterion further reduces the 1-
day event window sample by 18 appointments and the 3-day by 21 appointments.   
(iv) There must be no ‘perhaps’ confounding announcements in the event window so that the 
appointment announcement effect can be isolated. ‘Perhaps’ includes the following 
announcements: CEO departures or directorship changes. These announcements may create 
significant abnormal returns in their own right (Chang, Dasgupta, & Hilary, 2010). To 
implement this criterion, I follow the same steps as in (iii). This criterion further reduces the 
sample for both event windows by 39 appointments.  
 
For each event window, I use three samples: sample 1 passes criteria (i) through (iii), sample 2 
passes criteria (i) through (iv), and sample 3 is a common sample - it is used in the analysis of all 
three performance measures. Sample 3 passes criteria (i) through (iii) of this chapter, criterion (i) of 
Chapter 5, and criteria (i) through (iii) of Chapter 6.13 For both event windows, sample 1 has 118 
aaaa 
                                                             
12 I use trade-to-trade returns, so sometimes the event window’s abnormal return is calculated using prices 
prior to the window. For these cases, I check for earlier confounding announcements. 
13 I use the most lenient sample selection criteria of each chapter so that sample 3 is not too small.   
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Figure 4.1: Samples of the Event Study  
 
Sample before Restrictions
 
 
 
Event Study Samples - first row sample 1, second row sample 2, third row sample 3  
 
    1-day Event Window    3-day Event Window 
 
 
42 
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38 
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82 
51% 
Insider
Grey Insider
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29 
25% 
31 
26% 
58 
49% 
28 
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30 
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60 
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17 
22% 
15 
19% 
47 
59% 
16 
20% 
14 
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49 
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27 
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28 
25% 
55 
50% 
26 
24% 
27 
25% 
56 
51% 
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appointments and sample 2 has 79 appointments.14 Sample 3 has 110 appointments for the 1-day 
window and 109 for the 3-day window. 
 
Figure 4.1 presents the CEO origin distribution of the six samples. As a reference point, I first show 
the graph of the sample before any restrictions. As shown in the rest of the graphs, the CEO origin 
distribution does not significantly change for sample 1 or 3. There is, however, a significant change 
for sample 2 - outsiders increase their dominance at the expense of insiders and grey insiders. 
 
4.3 Event Study Analysis  
 
I first plot the average abnormal returns over time. The graphs of the 1-day event window samples 
are shown in Figure 4.2; the graphs of the 3-day samples resemble those of Figure 4.2 so are not 
shown. There is no obvious spike in the All series around the event windows: CEO appointments in 
general do not appear to elicit a significant reaction from investors. For day 0, outsiders appear to 
perform moderately better than insiders and significantly better than grey insiders. For the three 
days centred on day 0, grey insiders close the performance gap: their 3-day abnormal return appears 
to be on par with outsiders and better than insiders. Overall, Figure 4.2 supports the following 
abnormal return relation: outsiders > grey insiders >= insiders.  
 
I also plot the distribution of abnormal returns. The graphs of sample 1 are shown in Figure 4.3; the 
graphs of sample 2 and 3 resemble those of Figure 4.3 so are not shown. For both event windows, 
the All distribution is symmetrical with an average abnormal return around 0%. Also for both 
windows, the outsider distribution appears best with the highest average and the fattest right tail. 
For the 3-day window, grey insiders have the highest number of outstanding performers: 13% of 
them are associated with 3-day abnormal returns in excess of 5%. Figure 4.3 also reveals that a 
significant portion of insiders are associated with abnormal returns between -1 and 1%. Overall, 
Figure 4.3 provides more evidence that outsiders are associated with the highest average abnormal 
returns. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 The 1-day and 3-day sample 1s are different; it is just a coincidence that they have the same number of 
appointments. This is also true for sample 2. 
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Figure 4.2: Abnormal Returns over Time  
 
Graphs of the 1-day Event Window Samples 
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Figure 4.3: Distributions of Abnormal Returns 
 
Graphs of Sample 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Before analysing average abnormal returns, I address the potential problem of outliers. As shown in 
Figure 4.3, there are several appointments in the tails of the distributions. If these appointments are 
outliers then they will bias the analysis. To avoid this problem, the six samples are winsorised. I 
calculate the mean and standard deviation of the abnormal returns for each sample. For any 
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by the winsorising process. For all of the 3-day samples, one appointment has its abnormal return 
set to the respective sample’s upper limit. For all of the 1-day samples, two appointments have their 
abnormal return set to the respective sample’s lower limit; and for sample 2, one appointment has 
its abnormal return set to the sample’s upper limit. 
 
Table 4.2: Appointments Affected by the Winsorising Process 
For each sample, Table 4.2 shows the number of appointments affected by the winsorising process. The 
winsorising process is as follows: (a) calculate the mean and standard deviation of the abnormal returns for 
each sample; and (b) for any appointments that do not fall within mean ± 3*stdev for the given sample, set 
their abnormal return equal to closest end of this range. The CEO origins and samples are defined in 
Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 
1-day 
Window, 
Sample 1 
1-day 
Window, 
Sample 2 
1-day 
Window, 
Sample 3 
3-day 
Window, 
Sample 1 
3-day 
Window, 
Sample 2 
3-day 
Window, 
Sample 3 
Lower 
Limit 
2 grey 
Insiders 
1 insider  
&  1 grey 
insider 
2 grey 
insiders 
- - - 
Upper 
Limit 
- 1 outsider - 
1 grey 
insider 
1 grey 
insider 
1 grey 
insider 
 
Using the winsorised samples, I calculate mean abnormal returns and present the results in Table 
4.3. In columns (1) through (4), I display the means of each sample and the p-values of each mean.15 
Column (1) shows that CEO appointments in general are associated with small positive abnormal 
returns that cannot be statistically distinguished from 0. In comparison, several studies analyse US 
CEO appointments and find similar sized abnormal returns (between 0.3 and 0.8%) that are 
statistically significant (Adams & Mansi, 2009; Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 2012; Falato et al., 2009; 
Huson et al., 2004). In column (2), I show that insiders elicit negative abnormal returns that are 
statistically insignificant. An insignificant finding for insiders is consistent with several papers (e.g., 
Adams & Mansi, 2009; Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 2012; Falato et al., 2009). 
Column (3) shows that grey insiders are associated with mixed abnormal returns: their 1-day 
                                                             
15 I use t-statistics in columns (1) through (4). An obvious extension, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, is 
to use more sophisticated non-parametric statistics. Bartholdy et al. (2007) explain how to use such statistics 
on trade-to-trade abnormal returns.  
26 
 
abnormal return is around -0.9%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level for samples 1 and 
3; whereas their 3-day abnormal return is around 0.5%, which is statistically insignificant for all 
samples. Finally, column (4) reveals that outsiders are associated with positive abnormal returns: 
they have a 1-day abnormal return of around 1%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level for 
all samples; and they have a 3-day abnormal return of around 0.6%, which is statistically insignificant 
for all samples. These abnormal returns are in the lower range of those observed in the US and UK; 
other studies find outsider abnormal returns of between 0.8 and 2.7% which are statistically 
significant at the 1% level (Adams & Mansi, 2009; Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 
2012; Falato et al., 2009).  
 
In the final three columns of Table 4.3, I display the differences in means and the p-values of the 
differences. Column (5) shows that insiders deliver a 1-day abnormal that is approximately 0.8% 
higher than that delivered by grey insiders; this difference, however, cannot be statistically 
distinguished from 0. The performance relation is reversed for the 3-day period: grey insiders deliver 
an abnormal return that is approximately 0.9% higher than that delivered by insiders; this difference 
again, however, cannot be statistically distinguished from 0. In column (6), I document that outsiders 
are associated with higher abnormal returns than insiders: the 1-day differential is approximately 
1.0%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level for samples 1 and 2 and statistically significant 
at the 5% level for sample 3; and the 3-day differential is approximately 1.1%, which is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level for sample 3. In comparison, other studies use US and UK CEO 
appointments and also find that outsiders dominate insiders; they report differences between 0.6 
and 2.3% that are statistically significant (Adams & Mansi, 2009; Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Falato & 
Kadyrzhanova, 2012). Finally, column (7) reveals that outsiders elicit higher abnormal returns than 
grey insiders do. For the 1-day window, the difference is approximately 1.9%, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. For the 3-day window, grey insiders close the performance gap: the 
difference is approximately 0.2% and is no longer statistically significant.  
 
Overall, this section shows that outsiders are associated with the highest abnormal returns. On the 
appointment announcement day, outsiders have significant positive abnormal returns, which are 
significantly higher than those of insiders and grey insiders. The event study analysis also finds no 
systematic performance difference between insiders and grey insiders. These findings must be 
interpreted with caution, however, as simple bivariate comparisons do not control for factors that 
may be correlated with CEO origin and abnormal returns. In the next section, I control for such 
factors and isolate the effect of CEO origin on abnormal returns. 
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Table 4.3: Event Study Results 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the event study. Panels A and B show the 1-day and 3-day appointment 
announcement abnormal returns respectively. In columns (1) through (4), the number outside the parenthesis 
is the mean abnormal return, and the number inside the parenthesis is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, 
checking whether the mean is statistically significant from 0. In columns (5) through (7), the number outside 
the parenthesis is the difference in mean abnormal returns, and the number inside the parenthesis is the p-
value of a two tailed t-test, checking whether the difference is statistically significant from 0. This latter t-test 
assumes an unequal variance between the two respective samples. The CEO origins and samples are defined in 
Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 All Insider 
Grey 
Insider 
Outsider 
Difference 
(2) - (3) 
Difference  
(2) - (4) 
Difference  
(3) - (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: 1-day Window 
Sample 1 
0.24% 
(0.279) 
0.07% 
(0.875) 
-0.93% 
(0.063) 
0.95% 
(0.001) 
1.00% 
(0.133) 
-0.88% 
(0.096) 
-1.88% 
(0.001) 
Sample 2 
0.45% 
(0.061) 
-0.08% 
(0.864) 
-0.65% 
(0.288) 
0.99% 
(0.001) 
0.58% 
(0.447) 
-1.07% 
(0.055) 
-1.64% 
(0.021) 
Sample 3 
0.15% 
(0.509) 
-0.18% 
(0.657) 
-1.07% 
(0.053) 
0.94% 
(0.001) 
0.89% 
(0.185) 
-1.12% 
(0.025) 
-2.01% 
(0.002) 
Average 0.28% -0.06% -0.89% 0.96% 0.82% -1.02% -1.85% 
Panel B: 3-day Window 
Sample 1 
0.30% 
(0.379) 
-0.45% 
(0.341) 
0.37% 
(0.685) 
0.61% 
(0.175) 
-0.81% 
(0.424) 
-1.06% 
(0.103) 
-0.25% 
(0.806) 
Sample 2 
0.50% 
(0.255) 
-0.31% 
(0.636) 
0.63% 
(0.698) 
0.73% 
(0.158) 
-0.94% 
(0.590) 
-1.05% 
(0.213) 
-0.10% 
(0.951) 
Sample 3 
0.22% 
(0.548) 
-0.68% 
(0.144) 
0.38% 
(0.706) 
0.56% 
(0.238) 
-1.06% 
(0.340) 
-1.24% 
(0.061) 
-0.18% 
(0.875) 
Average 0.34% -0.48% 0.46% 0.63% -0.94% -1.11% -0.18% 
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4.4 Regression Analysis 
 
I estimate the following regressions:  
 
       (       )   (    )   (    )   (        )   (     )                    ( 4.5 ) 
 
       (        )   (    )   (    )   (        )   (     )                ( 4.6 ) 
 
where    is the winsorised abnormal return. INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER are dummy variables, 
which are set equal to 1 if the appointment is an insider, grey insider, or outsider respectively, and 0 
otherwise; the CEO origin classification is outlined in section 3.2. (4.5) gives the performance of 
insiders and greys relative to outsiders, whereas (4.6) gives the performance of outsiders and grey 
insiders relative to insiders; estimating (4.5) and (4.6) ensures that each CEO origin is compared with 
the other two. I estimate the (4.5) and (4.6) with OLS and adjust the standard errors for within firm 
correlation. 
 
4.4.1 Control Variables 
 
SIZE measures the appointing firm’s size. SIZE is equal to log(ASSET), where ASSET is the book value 
of the firm’s total assets measured at the CEO’s starting date and then converted to June 2012 
dollars.16 I take the log of ASSET to mitigate the effect of outliers, and describe the data collection 
process for ASSET and all the other control variables in Appendix A.5. I control for SIZE because 
shares of smaller firms have outperformed those of larger firms (Fama & French, 1992); and because 
smaller firms have less insider candidates and so are more likely to hire outsider candidates (e.g., 
Agrawal et al., 2006; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Lauterbach et al., 1999; Parrino, 1997).  
 
INDUSTRY indicates the appointing firm’s industry at the time of the appointment announcement. 
INDUSTRY consists of five dummy variables that are based on the six broad NZX industry 
                                                             
16
 To measure ASSET at the CEO’s starting date, I take a weighted average of the preceding and subsequent 
total asset figures. Sometimes the subsequent figure is not available, so I only use the preceding figure. This 
weighted average is then converted to June 2012 dollars by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which is 
available from http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/tables/m1/. 
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classifications: energy, goods, primary, property, services, and investment (the excluded dummy).17 I 
control for INDUSTRY because the importance of a CEO may differ across industries, influencing the 
reaction of investors. It is hard to tell ex-ante which industries will be associated with higher 
abnormal returns because I cannot find any related literature. INDUSTRY may also be correlated with 
CEO origin. Different industries may seek different levels of specific and generic skills and hence 
favour different CEO origins. Also, Parrino (1997) finds that firms with more competitors (i.e., 
competitive industries) are more likely to hire outsiders; these firms can poach experienced outsider 
executives from similar firms.  
 
PRIOR measures the appointing firm’s performance prior to the appointment announcement. PRIOR 
is the firm’s stock return minus the NZX All’s stock return over the 12 months prior to the 
appointment announcement.18 I control for PRIOR because CEOs who inherit struggling firms may 
have greater scope to improve firm prospects, which investors presumably realise and incorporate 
into their reaction. Consistent with this story, Denis and Denis (1995) find significant positive 
abnormal returns around the appointment announcement for forced turnovers (a proxy for low 
PRIOR), and insignificant returns for voluntary turnover (a proxy for high PRIOR).  
 
PRIOR is also likely correlated with CEO origin; several studies find that thriving firms hire more 
insiders and struggling firms hire more outsiders (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Ang & Nagel, 2009; 
Parrino, 1997). Boards of thriving firms seek the status quo and believe that insiders, with their firm-
specific knowledge, can provide this with the least disruption. Also, thriving firms can attract 
talented senior executives and have sufficient resources to help them improve their management 
skills, implying that these firms are more likely to have strong insider candidates. Conversely, boards 
of struggling firms seek change and believe that outsiders, with their fresh perspectives and outside 
experience, can provide this with the most efficiency. Struggling firms may also have weaker insider 
candidates.  
 
                                                             
17 The goods, primary, and services classifications consist of several sub-industries. Goods contain food and 
beverages, intermediate and durables, and textiles and apparel. Primary contains agriculture and fishing, 
building materials and construction, forestry and forest products, and mining. Services contain consumer, 
finance and other services, leisure and tourism, media and telecommunications, ports, and transport. The 
small sample size of this thesis permits using these sub-industries as more refined classifiers.  
18 The return period ends two days before the appointment announcement date, so that PRIOR excludes 
returns caused by the announcement.     
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Table 4.4 presents the summary statistics of the control variables. The summary statistics are based 
on the entire thesis sample rather than the more restricted event study samples. In the ASSET row of 
Table 4.4, I show that the mean (median) firm size is approximately $1109m ($185m). I also discover 
a large range in firm sizes: the smallest firm has around $1m worth of assets, while the largest has 
around $12b. These firms are generally much smaller than those used in comparable studies (e.g., 
Ang & Nagel, 2009; Huson et al., 2004); and presumably this is because this thesis analyses NZ (i.e., 
small economy) firms, whereas comparable studies analyse US (i.e., big economy) firms. The ASSET 
row shows that grey insiders are appointed to the largest firms on average and that insiders are, as 
expected, appointed to larger firms than outsiders. 
 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of the Control Variables 
Table 4.4 presents the summary statistics of the control variables. The summary statistics are based on the 
entire thesis sample rather than the more restricted event study samples. The CEO origins and control 
variables are defined in Appendix A.1. 
 # Obs  Mean  Median  Stdev  Minimum Maximum 
ASSET ($m) 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
162 
42 
38 
82 
 
1109 
1543 
1554 
680 
 
185 
272 
353 
114 
 
2317 
2796 
2581 
1814 
 
1 
19 
1 
3 
 
11896 
11896 
11195 
11528 
SIZE 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
162 
42 
38 
82 
 
5.32 
5.49 
5.52 
5.15 
 
5.27 
5.43 
5.55 
5.06 
 
0.84 
0.81 
0.96 
0.76 
 
3.06 
4.28 
3.06 
3.40 
 
7.08 
7.08 
7.05 
7.06 
INDUSTRY 
All 
 
Insiders 
 
Grey Insiders 
 
Outsiders 
 
 
162 
 
42 
 
38 
 
82 
 
 
10% ENERGY, 13% GOODS, 19% PRIMARY, 6% PROPERTY, 46% 
SERVICES, and 6% INVESTMENT 
7% ENERGY, 14% GOODS, 24% PRIMARY, 5% PROPERTY, 48% 
SERVICES, and 2% INVESTMENT 
16% ENERGY, 5% GOODS, 13% PRIMARY, 11% PROPERTY, 39% 
SERVICES, and 16% INVESTMENT 
8% ENERGY, 15% GOODS, 19% PRIMARY, 5% PROPERTY, 49% 
SERVICES, and 4% INVESTMENT 
PRIOR 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
161 
42 
38 
81 
 
-8% 
-4% 
-17% 
-6% 
 
-6% 
-1% 
-12% 
-4% 
 
39% 
35% 
43% 
38% 
 
-96% 
-82% 
-92% 
-96% 
 
133% 
128% 
107% 
133% 
 
Table 4.4 also displays the breakdown of firms by INDUSTRY: 10% energy, 13% goods, 19% primary, 
6% property, 46% services, and 6% investment. These numbers compare closely to the NZX’s current 
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composition (as at 23 April 2014): 8% energy, 12% goods, 13% primary, 9% property, 49% services, 
and 10% investment.19 The INDUSTRY row reveals that insiders are more prevalent in the primary 
industry, whereas grey insiders are more prevalent in the energy, property, and investment 
industries. And outsiders are not especially common in any of the industries.  
 
In the PRIOR row of Table 4.4, I observe that CEO appointments generally occur after poor firm 
performance. This observation is consistent with the literature (e.g., Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Huson et 
al., 2004; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988). The PRIOR row also shows that grey insiders inherit the 
poorest performing firms on average and that outsiders inherit, as expected, poorer performing 
firms than insiders. 
 
4.4.2 Regression Results 
 
Before presenting the regression results, I check for multicollinearity. I calculate the correlations 
between each pair of independent variables and display the results for sample 1 of the 1-day 
window in Table 4.5; I do not display the correlation tables of the other samples as they are similar 
to Table 4.5. Table 4.5 shows that the independent variables are not highly correlated with each 
other, so multicollinearity is not a problem. In fact, the correlations are all smaller than |0.5| except 
those among the CEO origin variables.  
 
Table 4.6 summarises the regression results. In columns (1) through (3), I present the coefficient 
estimates and p-values of the INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER variables. Column (1) confirms that 
outsiders outperform insiders: the 1-day and the 3-day differentials are approximately 1.2% and 
1.7% respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 5% level for all samples. A recent study 
that also controls for other factors is Adams and Mansi (2009); they analyse US CEO appointments 
and document a 3-day differential of 1.4%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. In column 
(2), I show that outsiders deliver higher abnormal returns than grey insiders, but the differences are 
only statistically significant over the 1-day period for samples 1 and 3. These significant differences 
are economically large, about 1.7%. Finally, column (3) reveals no statistically significant differences 
between insiders and grey insiders. 
 
                                                             
19 I exclude NZAX and Overseas (No Index) firms from this current sample so that I do not have to manually re-
categorise their industries. In contrast, I include some of these firms in the thesis sample. So the current and 
thesis samples are selected slightly differently. 
32 
 
Table 4.5: Correlations between Independent Variables 
Table 4.5 shows the correlations between the independent variables of sample 1 of the 1-day window. The 
correlation tables of the other samples are similar to Table 4.5. The independent variables and samples are 
defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. INSIDER 1.00          
2. GREY -0.34 1.00         
3. OUTSIDER -0.56 -0.59 1.00        
4. SIZE 0.11 0.07 -0.16 1.00       
5. PRIMARY 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.12 1.00      
6. ENERGY -0.01 0.10 -0.08 0.21 -0.17 1.00     
7. GOODS 0.08 -0.11 0.03 -0.33 -0.18 -0.13 1.00    
8. PROPERTY -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.13 -0.09 -0.10 1.00   
9. SERVICES 0.01 -0.14 0.12 0.11 -0.42 -0.31 -0.34 -0.24 1.00  
10. PRIOR 0.01 -0.15 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.05 1.00 
 
Table 4.7 presents the full regression outputs of equation (4.5); those of equation (4.6) are omitted 
as they do not add anything new except the performance of grey insiders relative to outsiders which 
is documented in Table 4.6. SIZE’s coefficients are consistently positive, which is a surprise. They are 
statistically significant at the 10% level for all but one sample and are economically significant: 
approximately 0.6% and 1.3% for the 1-day and 3-day windows respectively. Energy and goods are 
the only INDUSTRY dummy variables that are statistically significant for more than one sample; these 
industries are associated with higher 1-day abnormal returns than the investment industry and the 
differences are economically significant (between 2.4 and 3.8%). PRIOR’s coefficients are negative as 
predicted, but they cannot be statistically distinguished from 0. The regressions have an average R-
squared of around 0.27 and 0.11 for the 1-day and 3-day windows respectively.         
 
Overall, the regression results confirm the earlier findings: outsiders are associated with the highest 
1-day abnormal returns; outsiders deliver significantly higher 3-day abnormal returns than that 
delivered by insiders; and there is no performance difference between insiders and grey insiders. 
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Table 4.6: Summarised Regression Results 
Table 4.6 summarises the results of the regression analysis. Panels A and B show the 1-day and 3-day event 
window results respectively. Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are estimated using OLS and the standard errors are 
adjusted for within firm correlation. The dependent variable is    (the winsorised appointment 
announcement abnormal return). The independent variables of interest are INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER. 
The control variables are SIZE, INDUSTRY, and PRIOR. In columns (1) through (3), the number outside the 
parenthesis is the coefficient of INSIDER in equation (4.5), GREY in equation (4.5), and GREY in equation (4.6) 
respectively; and the number inside the parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, checking whether the 
coefficient is statistically significant from 0. The variables and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 
respectively. 
 INSIDER relative to 
OUTSIDER 
GREY relative to 
OUTSIDER 
GREY relative to 
INSIDER 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: 1-day Window 
Sample 1 
-1.13%  
(0.024) 
-1.71%  
(0.002) 
-0.58%  
(0.364) 
Sample 2 
-1.05%  
(0.018) 
-1.08%  
(0.114) 
-0.002%  
(0.972) 
Sample 3 
-1.40%  
(0.004) 
-1.76%  
(0.003) 
-0.36%  
(0.570) 
Average -1.19% -1.52% -0.32% 
Panel B: 3-day Window 
Sample 1 
-1.56%  
(0.011) 
-1.12%  
(0.243) 
0.44%  
(0.651) 
Sample 2 
-1.67%  
(0.023) 
-1.33%  
(0.314) 
0.34%  
(0.815) 
Sample 3 
-1.76%  
(0.006) 
-1.13%  
(0.283) 
0.63%  
(0.555) 
Average -1.66% -1.19% 0.47% 
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Table 4.7: Full Regression Results 
Table 4.7 presents the full regression outputs of equation (4.5); those of equation (4.6) are omitted as they do 
not add anything new except the performance of grey insiders relative to outsiders which is documented in 
Table 4.6. Panels A and B show the 1-day and 3-day event window regression outputs respectively. Equation 
(4.5) is estimated using OLS and the standard errors are adjusted for within firm correlation. Equation (4.5)’s 
dependent variable is    (the winsorised appointment announcement abnormal return). The independent 
variables of interest are INSIDER and GREY. The control variables are SIZE, INDUSTRY (five dummy variables), 
and PRIOR. The number outside the parenthesis is the coefficient estimate and the number inside the 
parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, checking whether the coefficient is statistically significant 
from 0. The variables and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Panel A: 1-day Window 
INTERCEPT -5.04% (0.006) -4.64% (0.014) -4.90% (0.008) 
INSIDER -1.13% (0.024) -1.05% (0.018) -1.40% (0.004) 
GREY -1.71% (0.002) -1.08% (0.114) -1.76% (0.003) 
SIZE 0.74% (0.014) 0.50% (0.103) 0.73% (0.015) 
PRIMARY 1.89% (0.246) 2.79% (0.100) 1.86% (0.248) 
ENERGY 2.47% (0.109) 2.88% (0.039) 2.37% (0.015) 
GOODS 3.03% (0.047) 3.78% (0.008) 2.98% (0.049) 
PROPERTY 1.86% (0.206) 2.78% (0.041) 1.51% (0.306) 
SERVICES 1.91% (0.211) 2.85% (0.038) 1.73% (0.252) 
PRIOR -0.15% (0.748) -0.40% (0.472) -0.05% (0.917) 
# Obs, R-squared  118, 0.251  79, 0.285  110, 0.274 
Panel B: 3-day Window 
INTERCEPT -3.75% (0.382) -6.46% (0.386) -3.82% (0.379) 
INSIDER -1.56% (0.011) -1.67% (0.023) -1.76% (0.006) 
GREY -1.12% (0.243) -1.33% (0.314) -1.13% (0.283) 
SIZE 1.19% (0.029) 1.42% (0.075) 1.22% (0.030) 
PRIMARY -2.28% (0.481) -0.96% (0.853) -2.43% (0.456) 
ENERGY -1.58% (0.625) -0.62% (0.902) -1.69% (0.604) 
GOODS -0.88% (0.792) 0.99% (0.853) -1.14% (0.730) 
PROPERTY -3.40% (0.288) -1.60% (0.752) -3.90% (0.230) 
SERVICES -2.12% (0.515) -0.48% (0.926) -2.24% (0.493) 
PRIOR -1.35% (0.150) -2.09% (0.122) -1.28% (0.200) 
# Obs, R-squared  118, 0.098  79, 0.117 109, 0.105 
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There are a few limitations to this chapter’s analysis. A possible explanation for the poor 
performance of insiders is that their appointments are expected and hence investors do not react to 
their appointment announcements; consistent with this explanation, Table 4.3 shows that the 
abnormal returns of insiders cannot be statistically distinguished from zero. Another possible 
weakness of this chapter’s analysis is that the CAPM can be a poor model for estimating expected 
returns (Fama & French, 2004); further research could experiment with other models. Finally, this 
chapter’s analysis relies on reduced sample sizes due to the lack of share price data and the 
presence of confounding announcements.  
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5 Change in the Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between CEO origin and the 3-year change in the 
appointing firm’s market-to-book (MTB) ratio. Before doing this examination, I explain the rationale 
and measurement of the change in MTB ratio, and outline the sample selection for this chapter’s 
analysis. 
 
5.1 Rationale and Measurement  
 
In the previous chapter, the appointment announcement abnormal returns focus on the expected 
impact of the CEO on shareholders. I am also interested in the realised impact of the CEO, so I use a 
longer term performance measure: the 3-year change in the appointing firm’s MTB ratio. The MTB 
ratio is used as a proxy for Tobin’s q (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006). A positive change in the MTB ratio 
(or Tobin’s q) reveals that equity investors are willing to pay a higher market premium for the firm’s 
assets, i.e., those assets have become more ‘valuable’.   
 
I choose a market-based rather than an accounting-based performance measure for the following 
reasons: market measures are less susceptible to manipulation by opportunistic managers; market 
measures are forward looking, capturing the prospects of today’s actions by CEOs; market measures 
pick up changes in shareholder wealth, which is what finance scholars care about; and market 
measures implicitly control for non-time-varying firm characteristics because these characteristics 
are already priced into the base performance level. I use a 3-year period to measure performance 
because it is common to do so (e.g., Falato & Kadyrzhanova, 2012; Huson et al., 2004; Karaevli, 2007; 
Pérez-González, 2006).  
 
Firm j’s MTB ratio is defined as follows: 
 
       
                        
              
                                        
 
where                          and                are firm j’s time t market value of equity and 
book value of equity respectively.20 Therefore, 
 
                                                             
20 The data collection process for these variables is described in Appendix A.4. 
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is the 3-year change in the firm j’s MTB ratio.      is defined as a percentage change so that it 
scales changes: it recognises that a 0.5 increase is more significant from a low base (e.g.,             
equal to 1) rather than a high base (e.g.,             equal to 2). A percentage change also allows an 
intuitive interpretation of results and is approximately equal (for small changes at least) to the 
obvious alternative, a log change.  
 
             is measured prior to the appointment announcement, so that it excludes investor 
expectations about the appointed CEO. Specifically,                               is measured two 
trading days prior to the appointment announcement, whereas                      is measured at 
the announcement date.21  
 
The measurement of          is more complex. Each appointment falls into one of the following 
cases: 
(i) The CEO is still in the job after three years and the firm is still listed on the NZX after three 
years. In this case, I measure                           and                  at the end 
of the three years. The three years is defined as the CEO’s starting date plus three years.22 79 
(out of 162) appointments fall into this case, and the breakdown by CEO origin is 31 (out of 
42) insiders, 19 (out of 38) grey insiders, and 29 (out of 82) outsiders.  
(ii) The CEO is not in the job after three years and the firm is still listed on the NZX at the CEO’s 
leaving date. In this case,                  is measured at the CEO’s leaving date;
23 and 
                           is measured two days prior to the CEO’s leaving 
                                                             
21
 To measure                at an exact date, I take a weighted average of the preceding and subsequent 
book equity figures. Sometimes the subsequent figure is not available, so I only use the preceding figure.  
22 The starting date is the CEO’s first day in the job and it often differs from the appointment announcement 
date. I use the starting date so that all CEOs, who last three years, have an equal amount of time in the job to 
impress shareholders. 
23
 The leaving date is the CEO’s last day in the job. I use the leaving date rather than the 3-year date for the 
following reason: if the CEO leaves within three years and                  is measured at the 3-year date, 
then it may capture both the appointed CEO’s and the replacement CEO’s impact.  
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announcement.24 57 appointments fall into this case, and the breakdown by CEO origin is 6 
insiders, 12 grey insiders, and 39 outsiders. 
(iii) The firm delists from the NZX within three years of the CEO’s starting date and the CEO is 
still in the job at the time of delisting. In this case, the measurement of          depends 
on the reason for delisting:  
a. If the firm delists because it is in receivership, then I set         equal to 0 (i.e., I 
set       equal to -100%).
25 Seven appointments fall into this case, and the 
breakdown by CEO origin is three grey insiders and four outsiders. 
b. If the firm delists because it is acquired by a third party or because it decides to save 
on listing costs, then                            and                  are 
measured on the firm’s final NZX trading day.26 18 appointments fall into this case - 
16 are in the acquired group and 2 are in the decided to delist group. The 
breakdown by CEO origin is 5 insiders, 4 grey insiders, and 9 outsiders.  
   
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of             and         
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics of             and        . These variables are defined above.  
 Mean Median Stdev Minimum Maximum 
             2.08 1.37 2.49 -1.38 19.91 
         1.96 1.24 2.98 0.00 29.45 
 
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics of              and         . The Mean and Median 
columns show that the       s are generally greater than 1 - investors place a premium on the 
market value of equity. However, this premium is smaller for          than             . The 
Minimum column displays a negative              because one firm has a negative 
                  . A negative            can lead to a spurious     , but this is not a problem 
                                                             
24                            is measured two days prior to the CEO’s leaving announcement, so that it 
includes investor expectations about the appointed CEO and excludes expectations about the replacement 
CEO.  
25 CEOs of receivership firms often resign before the delisting date. Even though they do not technically fall 
into case (iii), I still set their         equal to 0.  
26 I use the final NZX trading day because it is the last possible date to record                           , 
giving the most up-to-date information on CEO performance. 
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here as the firm goes bankrupt (i.e., its      is manually set to -100%). The Maximum column 
shows that some firms have very high MTB ratios - presumably those with bright prospects. 
 
5.2 Sample Selection  
 
I start with the 162 CEO appointments and sequentially put each appointment through the following 
criteria: 
(i) There must be sufficient data to measure      . I cannot measure       for one 
appointment (an outsider) because its                             data is missing.  
(ii) There must be a clear link between firm performance and CEO performance. A grey area is 
as follows: should a CEO be held responsible for their firm being acquired? On the one hand, 
a CEO may have deliberately and brilliantly positioned the company to be taken over, 
extracting a takeover premium, and hence should be rewarded with a positive     ; or a 
CEO may have run the company so poorly that acquirers believe they can buy it cheaply and 
run it more efficiently. On the other hand, it is plausible that a takeover has little to do with 
the CEO. For example, the CEO could just be in the right place at the right time; the takeover 
premium is more from luck than the CEO’s actions. To rule out the latter possibility, I exclude 
the appointments whose       s are measured early because of a takeover. This criterion 
reduces the sample by 16 appointments (5 insiders, 4 grey insiders, and 7 outsiders).     
 
I use three samples: sample 1 passes criterion (i), sample 2 passes criteria (i) and (ii), and sample 3 is 
the common sample.27 Samples 1, 2, and 3 have 161, 145, and 110 appointments respectively. The 
CEO origin distribution of the three samples is very similar to that of the sample before restrictions.      
 
5.3 Initial Analysis 
 
I present the summary statistics of      in Table 5.2 and display the distributions of      in 
Figure 5.1. The All rows of Table 5.2 show that CEO appointments are generally associated with small 
positive mean     s, but large negative median     s. This discrepancy can be explained by the 
natural asymmetry in     ’s distribution: its downside is limited to -100%, whereas its upside is 
unlimited. The means and medians are smallest for sample 2 which makes sense because this 
                                                             
27 As explained in Chapter 4, sample 3 is used in the analysis of all three performance measures. For this and 
the next chapter, I use the common sample of the 1-day (rather than the 3-day) event window because it is 
slightly larger.  
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sample excludes some appointments associated with takeover premiums. In the All plots of Figure 
5.1, I find that approximately 60% of CEO appointments are associated with negative     s. I also 
discover that there is a lot of variation in     : the All columns display a range of 487% and a 
standard deviation between 74 and 80%; and the All plots show that approximately 13% of CEOs do 
poorly (     < -60%) and 10% do well (     > 100%).  
 
I find that insiders deliver the highest mean     s and also deliver no shocking performances 
(     < -80%). Grey insiders are associated with the highest median     s but are risky: they 
have the highest range and standard deviation, and approximately 20% of them perform poorly 
(     < -60%). Finally, outsiders are easily the worst performers. A large majority of outsiders 
destroy shareholder wealth - around 70% of outsiders deliver negative     s, whereas only 
around 55% of insiders and around 50% of grey insiders do likewise. The summary statistics and 
graphs support the following performance relation: insiders = greys >> outsiders. 
 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of     
Table 5.2 presents the summary statistics of      (the 3-year change in the appointing firm’s market-to-
book ratio). Panels A, B, and C show the statistics of samples 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The CEO origins and 
samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively.  
 # Obs Mean Median Stdev Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Sample 1 
All 161 4% -15% 77% -100% 387% 
Insider 42 16% -4% 70% -77% 224% 
Grey Insider 38 11% 0% 93% -100% 387% 
Outsider 81 -6% -21% 72% -100% 290% 
Panel B: Sample 2 
All 145 1% -20% 80% -100% 387% 
Insider 37 12% -16% 73% -77% 224% 
Grey Insider 34 10% -5% 98% -100% 387% 
Outsider 74 -9% -22% 73% -100% 290% 
Panel C: Sample 3 
All 110 2% -16% 74% -100% 387% 
Insider 27 14% -6% 68% -77% 170% 
Grey Insider 28 14% -2% 102% -100% 387% 
Outsider 55 -10% -21% 58% -100% 235% 
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Figure 5.1: Distributions of       
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5.4 Bivariate Analysis 
 
Before doing the bivariate analysis, I address the potential problem of outliers. As shown in Figure 
5.1, there are several appointments in the tails of the distributions. If these appointments are 
outliers then they will bias the analysis. To avoid this problem, the three samples are winsorised. I 
calculate the mean and standard deviation of      for each sample. For any appointments that do 
not fall within mean ± 3*stdev for the given sample, I set their      equal to the closest end of 
this range. As shown in Table 5.3, the number of appointments affected by the winsorising process is 
three for sample 1, two for sample 2, and two for sample 3. These appointments are either grey 
insiders or outsiders and their     s are set to their respective sample’s upper limit.   
 
Table 5.3: Appointments Affected by the Winsorising Process 
For each sample, Table 5.3 details the number of appointments affected by the winsorising process. The 
winsorising process is as follows: (i) calculate the mean and standard deviation of      for each sample; and 
(ii) for any appointments that do not fall within mean ± 3*stdev for the given sample, set their      equal to 
closest end of this range. The CEO origins and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 
Using the winsorised samples, I run the bivariate analysis and present the results in Table 5.4. In 
columns (1) through (4) of Panel A, I display the mean     s of each sample and the p-values of 
each mean. And in columns (5) through (7) of Panel A, I display the differences in means and the p-
values of the differences. Due to the winsorising process, the means of CEOs in general, grey 
insiders, and outsiders are smaller than those in Table 5.2; insiders still have the highest means 
followed by grey insiders and then outsiders. However, almost all of the means and the differences 
cannot be statistically distinguished from 0; the exception is sample 1’s 21.93% insider-outsider 
difference, which is significant at the 10% level.    
 
 
 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Lower Limit - - - 
Upper Limit 
1 grey insider 
 & 2 outsiders 
1 grey insider 
 & 1 outsider 
1 grey insider 
 & 1 outsider 
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Table 5.4: Bivariate Results  
Table 5.4 summarises the results of the bivariate analysis, which uses winsorised      (the 3-year change in 
the appointing firm’s market-to-book ratio). In columns (1) through (4) of Panel A, the number outside the 
parenthesis is the mean      and the number inside the parenthesis is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, 
checking whether the mean is statistically significant from 0. In columns (5) through (7) of Panel A, the number 
outside the parenthesis is the difference in the respective means, and the number inside the parenthesis is the 
p-value of a two tailed t-test, checking whether the difference is statistically significant from 0. This latter t-test 
assumes an unequal variance between the two respective samples. In columns (1) through (4) of Panel B, the 
number outside the parenthesis is the median      and the number inside the parenthesis is the p-value of 
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, checking whether the median is statistically significant from 0. In columns (5) 
through (7) of Panel B, the word outside the parenthesis is the higher ranked distribution between the two 
respective CEO origin distributions, and the number inside the parenthesis is the p-value of a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test, checking whether the two distributions are statistically different. The CEO origins and samples 
are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 
All Insider 
Grey 
Insider 
Outsider 
Difference 
(2) – (3) 
Difference 
(2) - (4) 
Difference 
(3) - (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Mean     s 
Sample 1 
2.66% 
(0.638) 
15.68% 
(0.153) 
7.27% 
(0.571) 
-6.26% 
(0.416) 
8.41% 
(0.615) 
21.93% 
(0.100) 
13.53% 
(0.365) 
Sample 2 
-0.40% 
(0.949) 
12.43% 
(0.308) 
5.68% 
(0.692) 
-9.60% 
(0.242) 
6.75% 
(0.718) 
22.03% 
(0.134) 
15.28% 
(0.355) 
Sample 3 
0.39% 
(0.952) 
14.45% 
(0.280) 
7.86% 
(0.617) 
-10.32% 
(0.184) 
6.59% 
(0.747) 
24.77% 
(0.110) 
18.18% 
(0.300) 
Panel B: Median     s and Distribution Rankings 
Sample 1 
-14.93% 
(0.077) 
-3.90% 
(0.613) 
0.37% 
(0.811) 
-20.59% 
(0.008) 
insider 
(0.616) 
insider 
(0.044) 
grey insider 
(0.208) 
Sample 2 
-19.70% 
(0.009) 
-15.81% 
(0.862) 
-4.75% 
(0.555) 
-22.46% 
(0.002) 
insider 
(0.765) 
insider 
(0.071) 
grey insider 
(0.232) 
Sample 3 
-16.25% 
(0.055) 
-6.21% 
(0.683) 
-1.60% 
(0.699) 
-20.59% 
(0.007) 
insider 
(0.711) 
insider 
(0.087) 
grey insider 
(0.274) 
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After the winsorising process the means and medians of      remain very different, so I run some 
additional analysis. In columns (1) through (4) of Panel B, I display the median     s of each sample 
and the p-values of each median. Column (1) shows that CEO appointments in general have medians 
between -20 and -15%, which are statistically significant at the 1% level for sample 2 and statistically 
significant at the 10% level for samples 1 and 3. Columns (2) though (4) suggest that outsiders are the 
worst performers: the medians of insiders and grey insiders are statistically insignificant, whereas the 
medians of outsiders (around -21%) are statistically significant at the 1% level. In the next three 
columns of Panel B, I compare the      distributions of each CEO origin pair. Column (5) documents 
that insiders have higher ranked distributions than grey insiders, but the ranking differences are not 
statistically significant. In column (6), I discover that insiders have superior distributions to outsiders 
and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level for sample 1, and statistically significant at 
the 10% level for samples 2 and 3. Finally, column (7) reveals no statistically significant differences 
between grey insiders and outsiders.  
   
Overall, the bivariate findings dampen those of the initial analysis. The bivariate analysis provides 
some support for insiders outperforming outsiders, but provides no support for any other 
performance differences. These findings must be interpreted with caution, however, as simple 
bivariate comparisons do not control for factors that may be correlated with CEO origin and     . 
In the next section, I control for such factors and isolate the effect of CEO origin on     . 
 
5.5 Regression Analysis 
 
I estimate the following regressions: 
 
         (       )   (    )   (          )   (    )    (        )   
 (      )   (         )                                                                                              ( 5.1 ) 
 
         (        )   (    )    (          )   (    )    (        )  
 (      )   (         )                                                                                              ( 5.2 ) 
  
INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER are dummy variables, which are set equal to 1 if the appointment is 
an insider, grey insider, or outsider respectively, and 0 otherwise; the CEO origin classification is 
outlined in section 3.2. (5.1) gives the performance of insiders and grey insiders relative to outsiders, 
whereas (5.2) gives the performance of outsiders and grey insiders relative to insiders; estimating 
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(5.1) and (5.2) ensures that each CEO origin is compared with the other two. I estimate (5.1) and 
(5.2) with OLS and adjust the standard errors for within firm correlation.  
 
5.5.1 Control Variables 
 
EXCESS_MTB measures the appointing firm’s initial MTB ratio relative to those of other firms in the 
same industry.  Specifically, EXCESS_MTB is the residual (i.e.,  ) in the following OLS regression: 
 
                  (        )                 
 
where            and INDUSTRY are the firm’s initial MTB ratio (see section 5.1) and industry (see 
section 4.4.1) respectively. I control for EXCESS_MTB because CEOs who inherit struggling (i.e., low 
EXCESS_MTB) firms may have greater scope to improve firm prospects, and because shares of low 
MTB firms have outperformed those of high MTB firms (Fama & French, 1992). EXCESS_MTB is also 
likely correlated with CEO origin. As explained in section 4.4.1, thriving (i.e., high EXCESS_MTB) firms 
hire more insiders and struggling firms hire more outsiders (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Ang & Nagel, 
2009; Parrino, 1997).   
 
SIZE measures the appointing firm’s size (see section 4.4.1). I control for SIZE because shares of 
smaller firms have outperformed those of larger firms (Fama & French, 1992); and because smaller 
firms have less insider candidates and so are more likely to hire outsider candidates (e.g., Agrawal et 
al., 2006; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Lauterbach et al., 1999; Parrino, 1997). 
 
As defined in section 4.4.1, INDUSTRY indicates the appointing firm’s industry at the time of the 
appointment announcement. I control for INDUSTRY because unexpected changes in industry 
conditions - which are out of a CEO’s control - can change the future prospects of a firm. INDUSTRY 
may also be correlated with CEO origin. Different industries may seek different levels of specific and 
generic skills and hence favour different CEO origins. Also, Parrino (1997) finds that more 
competitive industries hire more outsiders.  
 
MARKET measures the share market’s return over the CEO’s performance period. MARKET is the real 
return of the NZX All Index (i.e., NZX All return minus CPI percentage change) measured over the 
period of      . MARKET is used as a control because unexpected changes in market conditions - 
which are out of a CEO’s control - can change the future prospects of a firm. It is unclear (ex-ante) 
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how MARKET is correlated with CEO origin, but it is possible that each CEO origin is more prevalent 
in different market conditions.  
 
REGULATED is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is regulated at the time of the appointment 
announcement, and 0 otherwise. I control for REGULATED because unexpected changes in 
regulatory conditions - which are out of a CEO’s control - can change the future prospects of a firm. I 
also control for REGULATED because regulated and unregulated firms may be systematically 
different, causing them to favour CEOs from different origins. For example, firms that operate in 
complex regulatory environments may favour experienced insiders. 
 
Table 5.5: Summary Statistics of the Control Variables 
Table 5.5 presents the summary statistics of the control variables. The summary statistics are based on the 
entire thesis sample rather than the more restricted samples of this chapter. I do not show the summary 
statistics of SIZE and INDUSTRY because they are presented in Table 4.4. The CEO origins and control variables 
are defined in Appendix A.1.  
 # Obs  Mean  Median  Stdev  Minimum Maximum 
EXCESS_MTB 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
161 
42 
38 
81 
 
0.00 
0.26 
0.04 
-0.15 
 
-0.40 
-0.51 
-0.36 
-0.29 
 
2.42 
3.42 
2.84 
1.39 
 
-3.88 
-1.96 
-3.88 
-2.02 
 
17.48 
17.48 
11.35 
4.76 
MARKET 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
162 
42 
38 
82 
 
10% 
11% 
13% 
8% 
 
9% 
10% 
9% 
8% 
 
30% 
31% 
30% 
30% 
 
-41% 
-33% 
-39% 
-41% 
 
90% 
72% 
74% 
90% 
REGULATED 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
162 
42 
38 
82 
 
6% REGULATED and 94% UNREGULATED 
5% REGULATED and 95% UNREGULATED 
8% REGULATED and 92% UNREGULATED 
6% REGULATED and 94% UNREGULATED 
 
Table 5.5 presents the summary statistics of the control variables. The summary statistics are based 
on the entire thesis sample rather than the more restricted samples of this chapter. I do not show 
the summary statistics for SIZE and INDUSTRY because they are presented in Table 4.4. In the 
EXCESS_MTB row, I find mixed support for the argument that outsiders inherit firms with low 
industry-adjusted MTB ratios: outsiders have the lowest mean EXCESS_MTB, but have the highest 
median EXCESS_MTB. This discrepancy may be explained by the low maximum EXCESS_MTB of 
outsiders. The MARKET row shows that the real return of the share market over the CEO 
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performance period averages around 10%, and that there are only small MARKET differences 
between CEO origins. The REGULATED statistics show that around 6% of firms are regulated, and 
that there are no marked REGULATED differences between CEO origins. 
 
5.5.2 Regression Results 
 
Before presenting the regression results, I check for multicollinearity. I calculate the correlations 
between each pair of independent variables and display the results for sample 1 in Table 5.6; I do 
not display the correlation tables of samples 2 and 3 as they are similar to Table 5.6. Table 5.6 shows 
that the independent variables are not highly correlated with each other, so multicollinearity is not a 
problem. The highest correlation is 0.60 between ENERGY and REGULATED.  
 
Table 5.7 summarises the regression results. In columns (1) through (3), I present the coefficient 
estimates and p-values of the INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER variables. In column (1), there is some 
evidence that insiders outperform outsiders: the sample 1 and sample 3 differentials, 23% and 36%, 
are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively; whereas the sample 2 differential is 
not statistically significant. So, the difference is only significant in the samples that credit CEOs with 
their firms being taken over. This performance difference contrasts the findings of comparable 
studies: Ang and Nagel (2009) find no significant difference when using Tobin’s q as a performance 
measure, and Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2012) find significant differences in favour of outsiders 
when using Tobin’s q. In columns (2) and (3), I find no statistically significant differences between 
grey insiders and outsiders and between grey insiders and insiders. 
 
Table 5.8 presents the full regression outputs of equation (5.1); those of equation (5.2) are omitted 
as they do not add anything new except the performance of grey insiders relative to outsiders which 
is documented in Table 5.7. EXCESS_MTB’s coefficients are negative, which is as expected. They are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for sample 1 and at the 10% level for samples 2 and 3. SIZE 
also has negative coefficients as predicted, but they cannot be statistically distinguished from 0. 
None of the INDUSTRY dummy variables are statistically significant. As expected, MARKET is 
economically and statistically significant: a one percentage point increase in MARKET leads to the 
same increase in     , a finding that is statistically significant at the 1% level across all samples. 
REGULATED’s coefficients are positive but cannot be statistically distinguished from 0. The 
regressions have an average R-squared of around 0.27. 
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Table 5.6: Correlations between Independent Variables 
Table 5.6 shows the correlations between the independent variables of sample 1. The correlation tables of samples 2 and 3 are similar to Table 5.6. The independent 
variables and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. INSIDER 1.00            
2. GREY -0.33 1.00           
3. OUTSIDER -0.60 -0.56 1.00          
4. EXCESS_MTB 0.06 0.01 -0.06 1.00         
5. SIZE 0.12 0.12 -0.21 -0.13 1.00        
6. PRIMARY 0.07 -0.09 0.01 0.00 0.10 1.00       
7. ENERGY -0.06 0.11 -0.04 0.00 0.25 -0.16 1.00      
8. GOODS 0.03 -0.12 0.07 0.00 -0.27 -0.18 -0.13 1.00     
9. PROPERTY -0.04 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.10 1.00    
10. SERVICES 0.01 -0.08 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.46 -0.31 -0.35 -0.24 1.00   
11. MARKET 0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.12 0.05 0.12 0.06 -0.03 1.00  
12. REGULATED -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.15 0.21 -0.13 0.60 -0.10 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 
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Table 5.7: Summarised Regression Results 
Table 5.7 summarises the results of the regression analysis. Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are estimated using OLS 
and the standard errors are adjusted for within firm correlation. The dependent variable is the winsorised 
     (the 3-year change in the appointing firm’s market-to-book ratio). The independent variables of 
interest are INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER. The control variables are EXCESS_MTB, SIZE, INDUSTRY, MARKET 
and REGULATED. In columns (1) through (3), the number outside the parenthesis is the coefficient of INSIDER 
in equation (5.1), GREY in equation (5.1), and GREY in equation (5.2) respectively; and the number inside the 
parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, checking whether the coefficient is statistically significant 
from 0. The variables and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 INSIDER relative to 
OUTSIDER 
GREY relative to 
OUTSIDER 
GREY relative to 
INSIDER 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample 1  
22.93%  
(0.087) 
7.14%  
(0.609) 
-15.78%  
(0.216) 
Sample 2 
20.94%  
(0.152) 
4.19%  
(0.787) 
-16.75%  
(0.229) 
Sample 3  
36.21%  
(0.014) 
12.55%  
(0.425) 
-23.66%  
(0.191) 
 
I also re-estimate the above regressions without MARKET. The rationale for doing so is as follows: (i) 
it is possible that MARKET is too good a control, masking the variation in     , and spuriously 
causing insignificant CEO origin coefficients; and (ii) it is not intuitively obvious how MARKET is 
correlated with CEO origin, so MARKET’s exclusion may not lead to omitted variable bias. After re-
running the regressions there is one significant change in the results: sample 3’s insider-outsider 
difference is now only significant at the 10% level as opposed to the 5% level. There are also a 
couple of minor changes. First and not surprisingly, the regressions now have much lower R-squared 
figures: 0.07 versus 0.27. And second, the EXCESS_MTB coefficients are no longer statistically 
significant at conventional levels. In summary, the results are not significantly altered: there is still 
some support for insiders outperforming outsiders, but no support for any other performance 
differences. 
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Table 5.8: Full Regression Results 
Table 5.8 presents the full regression outputs of equation (5.1); those of equation (5.2) are omitted as they do 
not add anything new except the performance of grey insiders relative to outsiders which is documented in 
Table 5.7. Equation (5.1) is estimated using OLS and the standard errors are adjusted for within firm 
correlation. Equation (5.1)’s dependent variable is the winsorised      (the 3-year change in the appointing 
firm’s market-to-book ratio). The independent variables of interest are INSIDER and GREY. The control 
variables are EXCESS_MTB, SIZE, INDUSTRY (five dummy variables), MARKET, and REGULATED. The number 
outside the parenthesis is the coefficient estimate and the number inside the parentheses is the p-value of a 
two tailed t-test, checking whether the coefficient is statistically significant from 0. The variables and samples 
are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
INTERCEPT 24.01% (0.589) 26.35% (0.557) 39.31% (0.448) 
INSIDER 22.93% (0.087) 20.94% (0.152) 36.21% (0.014) 
GREY 7.14% (0.609) 4.19% (0.787) 12.55% (0.425) 
EXCESS_MTB -4.75% (0.033) -4.33% (0.051) -4.49% (0.082) 
SIZE -6.93% (0.367) -6.85% (0.379) -13.12% (0.131) 
PRIMARY 17.00% (0.567) 13.02% (0.672) 24.17% (0.416) 
ENERGY 8.06% (0.797) 5.90% (0.852) 12.36% (0.700) 
GOODS -37.43% (0.195) -42.52% (0.155) -29.96% (0.347) 
PROPERTY -6.13% (0.829) -6.18% (0.831) 16.71% (0.591) 
SERVICES -6.36% (0.823) -11.10% (0.708) 12.63% (0.684) 
MARKET  109.49% (0.000) 110.88% (0.000) 98.39% (0.000) 
REGULATED 23.58% (0.292) 20.87% (0.352) 33.92% (0.140) 
# Obs 161 145 110 
R-squared 0.2695 0.2669 0.2695 
 
5.6 Selection Bias 
 
In this section, I investigate whether the above results are robust to selection bias. The first 
subsection presents a simple econometric model that highlights the intuition and mechanisms of 
selection bias, and a two-step procedure that (theoretically) removes this bias. The second 
subsection discusses the findings of the two-step procedure.  
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5.6.1 Econometrics of Selection Bias  
 
To keep the econometrics simple, I assume that there are only two CEO origins. I consider insiders 
and outsiders as an example. The model has a primary equation, which compares the performance 
of insiders and outsiders:  
 
         ( )   ( )         ( 5.3 ) 
 
where D is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the appointed CEO is an insider and 0 otherwise; 
and X is the vector of control variables used in equation (5.2). The performance of insiders relative to 
outsiders is given by the coefficient b. 
 
The model also has a selection equation, which predicts whether the appointed CEO is an insider or 
outsider:  
 
       ( )        ( 5.4 ) 
 
where D* is a latent variable and Z is a vector of observable variables that predict CEO origin. The 
relationship between D and D* is governed by 
 
   {
                    
                       
 
  
Equations (5.3) and (5.4) are connected via their error terms, which are assumed to have a bivariate 
normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix,  
 
[
    
   
]     ( 5.5 ) 
 
If the error terms   and   are correlated (i.e.,   is not equal to 0), then E(    ) is not equal to 0 and 
the OLS estimate of b is endogenous and hence biased and inconsistent. Intuitively, if there are 
unobservable factors that increase the chance of a low      and of an outsider appointment, then 
the previous section’s OLS findings are misleading: the poor performance of outsiders is not 
necessarily attributable to their outsider characteristics, but rather to their “selected” firm’s 
unobservable poor prospects. For example, directors may systematically select outsiders when they 
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know that firm prospects are poor - poorer than perhaps investors realise. As a result, the 
performance of outsiders may reflect not only their own actions but also their firm’s poor prospects; 
the performance of outsiders may be biased downwards. Put differently, how would insiders 
perform if they were selected by these same firms? Perhaps they would perform even worse than 
outsiders; perhaps selection bias is masking the inferior performance of insiders.  
 
To make this intuition more concrete, consider the expected value of performance when the CEO is 
an insider: 
 
 (         )        ( )     (      ) 
 
Using (5.5) and the properties of truncated binormal distributions, it follows that 
 
 (      )     
 (  )
 (  )
 
  
where   and   are the density and cumulative functions of the standard normal respectively 
(Greene, 2003 p. 759 and 788).  
 
Similarly, the expected value of performance when the CEO is an outsider is  
 
 (         )      ( )     (      ) 
 
In this case, 
 
 (      )     
  (  )
   (  )
 
 
So, the average performance difference between insiders and outsiders is 
 
 (         )    (         )       
 (  )
 (  )(   (  ))
                      (     ) 
 
The right-hand-side of equation (5.6) is the OLS estimate of b in equation (5.3). This estimate is made 
up of two terms: the first is the true performance difference between insiders and outsiders; and the 
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second is the selection bias due to unobservable factors. The OLS estimate is biased downwards if   
is negative and biased upwards if   is positive. As alluded to above, I suspect that   is positive: the 
previous section’s OLS finding may overstate the performance of insiders relative to outsiders. 
 
To correct for this bias, researchers employ a treatment effects model that is based on Heckman 
(1979)’s two-step procedure (Maddala, 1983).28 The first step estimates the selection equation, 
equation (5.4), with a binary probit model. The associated estimates are then used to compute a 
hazard variable, 
 
   
{
 
 
 
  ( ̂ )
 ( ̂ )
                  
 
  ( ̂ )
   ( ̂ )
                       
                              (   ) 
 
which is commonly referred to as the inverse Mills ratio. The second step estimates the primary 
equation, equation (5.3), with the inverse Mills ratio added as a control variable. In theory, the 
inverse Mills ratio controls for selection bias so that E(    ) is now equal to 0 and the estimate of b 
is exogenous and hence unbiased and consistent. A statistically significant inverse Mills ratio 
coefficient indicates that selection bias is present in the previous section’s OLS estimates. This 
method of controlling for selection bias is commonly used in the corporate finance literature (e.g., 
Ang & Nagel, 2009; Boyle & Roberts, 2013; Campa & Kedia, 2002; Chen, Lin, & Yi, 2008; Tucker, 
2010). 
 
5.6.2 Two-Step Results 
 
The two-step procedure, as laid out above, assumes that there is only one CEO origin dummy 
variable. In the previous section’s OLS regressions, however, there are two CEO origin dummy 
variables. Unfortunately, I do not know how to extend the two-step procedure to the two dummy 
variable case, so I compromise on the one dummy variable case.29 I use one dummy variable by 
partitioning each of this chapter’s samples into three subsamples: the first contains insider and 
                                                             
28 Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2011) and Tucker (2010) provide recent reviews of the treatment effects model.  
29
 It is possible to implement the two-step procedure with two CEO origin dummy variables. According to 
Tucker (2010, p.45), the first step estimates a multinomial logit model; the associated estimates are then used 
to form ratios that are not inverse Mills ratios; and these ratios are added as control variables to the second 
step regression. Unfortunately, I cannot find the formulas for such ratios so cannot proceed with this method.    
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outsider appointments; the second contains grey insider and outsider appointments; and the third 
contains grey insider and insider appointments.  
 
Using these subsamples, I estimate the first step regression:  
 
                  (    )     (        )    (     )    (      )   
  (         )    (         )                 ( 5.8 ) 
 
where CEO_ORIGIN is equal to INSIDER in the first subsample, and GREY in the other two 
subsamples; and INSIDER and GREY are defined in section 5.5. Equation (5.8) is estimated with a 
binary probit model and the standard errors are adjusted for within firm correlation. Equation (5.8) 
is, however, only estimated over the subsamples of sample 1; the AB_RETURN variable is not 
available for 44 appointments so the subsamples of samples 2 and 3 become too small.30 Equation 
(5.8) is also estimated without AB_RETURN over the subsamples of samples 1, 2, and 3.  
 
The first explanatory variable in equation (5.8) is SIZE which measures the appointing firm’s size (see 
section 4.4.1). I use SIZE because smaller firms have less insider candidates and so are more likely to 
hire outsider candidates (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Lauterbach et al., 1999; 
Parrino, 1997). The next explanatory variable is INDUSTRY which indicates the appointing firm’s 
industry at the time of the appointment announcement (see section 4.4.1).31 INDUSTRY is important 
because different industries may seek different levels of specific and generic skills and hence favour 
different CEO origins. Also, Parinno (1997) finds that more competitive industries hire more 
outsiders. PRIOR measures the appointing firm’s performance prior to the appointment 
announcement (see section 4.4.1). Several studies find that thriving firms hire more insiders and 
struggling firms hire more outsiders (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Ang & Nagel, 2009; Parrino, 1997). 
 
Equation (5.8) also includes PERIOD which roughly indicates the year of the CEO’s starting date. 
PERIOD consists of five dummy variables that are based on 3-year blocks: 1991 to 1993 (PERIOD1), 
                                                             
30 There is another reason to not use the subsamples of sample 3. After the AB_RETURN restrictions, sample 1 
and sample 3 are similar: sample 1 equals sample 3 plus eight appointments (two insiders, three grey insiders, 
and three outsiders).  
31 The PROPERTY dummy variable is excluded from two of the without AB_RETURN regressions: sample 3’s 
insider and outsider subsample and grey insider and insider subsample. I exclude PROPERY from these 
regressions because they only have two or three appointments from the property industry. 
55 
 
1994 to 1996 (PERIOD2), 1997 to 1999 (PERIOD3), 2000 to 2002 (PERIOD4), 2003 to 2005 (PERIOD5), 
and 2006 to 2008 (PERIOD6, the excluded dummy).32 I use 3-year blocks instead of 1-year blocks to 
preserve degrees of freedom in the regressions. I control for PERIOD because each CEO origin is 
more prevalent in different periods (as shown in section 3.3). BOARD_DEP measures the 
dependence of the appointing firm’s board of directors. BOARD_DEP is the proportion of directors 
who are firm executives at the time of the CEO appointment announcement. Several studies find 
that the likelihood of an insider appointment increases as board dependence increases (e.g., Boeker 
and Goodstein, 1993; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996; Dahya and McConnell, 2005; Huson, 
Parrino, and Starks, 2001). Finally, AB_RETURN is the winsorised 1-day appointment announcement 
abnormal return from sample 1 of Chapter 4 (see sections 4.1 and 4.2). As shown in section 4.3, 
AB_RETURN has a significant positive correlation with outsider appointments, an insignificant 
correlation with insider appointments, and a somewhat significant negative correlation with grey 
insider appointments.  
 
For a reliable implementation of the two-step procedure, some of the above variables need to be 
excluded from the second step regression (Lennox et al., 2011). The excluded variables are ideally 
highly correlated with CEO origin and independent of     . I hope that BOARD_DEP and 
AB_RETURN will satisfy these two conditions. As discussed above, these variables should be 
correlated with CEO origin. Also, BOARD_DEP should be independent of      because (in theory) 
it is priced into the firm’s initial MTB ratio. And AB_RETURN should not have a large influence on 
     because the random walk version of the efficient market hypothesis suggests that returns 
should be independent over time. However, the AB_RETURN and      periods do overlap, which 
may lead to some dependence. So, I subtract AB_RETURN from      when AB_RETURN is used in 
the first step regression.   
 
Table 5.9 presents the full regression outputs of equation (5.8). Panels A and B show the outputs 
with and without AB_RETURN respectively, and columns (1) through (3) display the marginal effects 
and p-values of each explanatory variable.33, 34 The SIZE row shows that bigger firms are, as 
expected, more likely to select an insider or grey insider over an outsider; the marginal effects are 
                                                             
32 The PERIOD1 dummy variable is excluded from the following regressions: the insider and outsider 
subsamples and the grey insider and insider subsamples. I exclude PRIOR1 from these regressions because 
they only have two or three appointments from the 1991 to 1993 period.  
33 Specifically, Panel B displays the outputs of the subsamples of sample 1; those of the subsamples of samples 
2 and 3 are not displayed as they are similar to Panel B. 
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Table 5.9: First Step Results 
Table 5.9 presents the regression outputs of equation (5.8). Panels A and B show the outputs with and without 
AB_RETURN respectively. Panel B displays the outputs of the subsamples of sample 1; those of the subsamples 
of samples 2 and 3 are not displayed as they are similar to Panel B. Equation (5.8) is estimated using a binary 
probit model and the standard errors are adjusted for within firm correlation. The dependent variable is 
CEO_ORIGIN, which equals INSIDER, GREY, and GREY for columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively. The explanatory 
variables are SIZE, INDUSTRY (five dummy variables), PRIOR, PERIOD (five dummy variables), BOARD_DEP, and 
AB_RETURN. The number outside the parenthesis is the marginal effect estimate and the number inside the 
parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, checking whether the probit coefficient is statistically 
significant from 0 (i.e., the p-value is from the probit regression output rather than the marginal effects 
output). The intercept is not shown because it does not have a marginal effect. The variables and samples are 
defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 INSIDER relative  
to OUTSIDER  
GREY relative  
to OUTSIDER 
GREY relative  
to INSIDER 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: With AB_RETURN 
SIZE 22.88% (0.000) 13.71% (0.020) 0.50% (0.953) 
PRIMARY -3.69% (0.886) -31.99% (0.054) -22.90% (0.365) 
ENERGY 5.71% (0.848) -21.39% (0.254) -16.26% (0.595) 
GOODS 21.85% (0.397) -31.22% (0.015) -30.95% (0.197) 
PROPERTY -27.56% (0.368) -28.31% (0.089) 3.22% (0.913) 
SERVICES -2.90% (0.912) -42.24% (0.003) -27.55% (0.212) 
PRIOR -7.34% (0.551) -9.42% (0.402) -13.77% (0.322) 
PERIOD1 NA 9.38% (0.518) NA 
PERIOD2 32.20% (0.071) 11.11% (0.461) -1.08% (0.960) 
PERIOD3 16.35% (0.274) 21.56% (0.189) 7.05% (0.722) 
PERIOD4 2.10% (0.900) 25.66% (0.058) 27.02% (0.163) 
PERIOD5 21.07% (0.077) 10.45% (0.441) -14.20% (0.463) 
BOARD_DEP 49.85% (0.202) 12.24% (0.710) -20.45% (0.612) 
AR -545.00% (0.031) -731.01% (0.001) -303.40% (0.253) 
# Obs  87 89 60 
Sensitivity, Specificity 48%, 86% 68%, 92% 65%, 76% 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
34 The marginal effects are calculated by setting all other right-hand-side variables to their mean values. The p-
values are from the probit regression outputs rather than the marginal effects outputs.  
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Panel B: Without AB_RETURN (sample 1) 
SIZE 14.84% (0.003) 10.51% (0.069) 1.25% (0.859) 
PRIMARY -6.11% (0.828) -49.69% (0.003) -43.87% (0.065) 
ENERGY -18.53% (0.552) -34.16% (0.100) -17.06% (0.548) 
GOODS -2.13% (0.937) -56.50% (0.001) -52.39% (0.024) 
PROPERTY -24.73% (0.436) -31.26% (0.115) -13.24% (0.642) 
SERVICES -11.42% (0.667) -47.05% (0.004) -38.77% (0.058) 
PRIOR 1.38% (0.891) -11.97% (0.310) -19.25% (0.162) 
PERIOD1 NA 18.58% (0.303) NA 
PERIOD2 10.93% (0.494) 6.52% (0.601) 5.54% (0.772) 
PERIOD3 8.71% (0.523) 12.82% (0.348) 6.59% (0.698) 
PERIOD4 7.78% (0.584) 27.21% (0.016) 21.04% (0.185) 
PERIOD5 21.57% (0.038) 8.85% (0.428) -16.96% (0.283) 
BOARD_DEP 17.88% (0.633) 18.11% (0.603) 18.37% (0.606) 
# Obs 123 119 80 
Sensitivity, Specificity 31%, 90%  42%, 93% 63%, 79% 
 
economically and statistically significant. Some of the INDUSTRY dummy variables are statistically 
significant, especially in the grey insider and outsider subsamples. In the PRIOR row, I discover a 
surprising result: better performing firms are more likely to hire outsiders. The PRIOR marginal 
effects cannot, however, be statistically distinguished from zero. The occasional PERIOD dummy 
variable is statistically significant. The BOARD_DEP row shows that more dependent boards are, as 
expected, more likely to choose an insider or grey insider over an outsider. Unfortunately, the 
marginal effects are statistically insignificant so BOARD_DEP is a weak excluded variable. The 
AB_RETURN marginal effects confirm the correlations of section 4.3. AB_RETURN is highly correlated 
with CEO origin and so satisfies the first property of a strong excluded variable. The regressions with 
AB_RETURN have an average sensitivity and specificity of around 60% and 85% respectively; and the 
regressions without AB_RETURN have averages of around 45% and 87% respectively. 
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I now estimate the second step regression:  
 
          (          )    (          )    (    )     (        )   
  (      )    (         )    ( )                                                                                 ( 5.9 ) 
 
where       is equal to winsorised      minus AB_RETURN if AB_RETURN is used in the first 
step regression, and winsorised      otherwise. CEO_ORIGIN is equal to INSIDER in the first 
subsample, and GREY in the other two subsamples.   is the inverse Mills ratio given by equation 
(5.7), and the other control variables are defined in section 5.5.1. I estimate (5.9) using OLS and 
adjust the standard errors for within firm correlation. 
 
Table 5.10 summarises the regression outputs of equation (5.9). Panels A and B show the outputs 
with and without the use of AB_RETURN in the first step respectively. Within each panel, the 
“Without  ” row shows the CEO_ORIGIN coefficients when   is excluded from equation (5.9); the 
“With  ” row shows the CEO_ORIGIN coefficients when   is included; and the “ ” row shows the   
coefficients when   is included. In column (1), I discover that the inclusion of   leads to perplexing 
results for the insider and outsider subsample. With AB_RETURN, the performance gap between 
insiders and outsiders widens by around 60 percentage points but becomes less statistically 
significant (from the 1% to the 10% level). However, without AB_RETURN, the performance gap 
moves in the opposite direction by approximately 40 and 100 percentage points for samples 1 and 2 
respectively; these new coefficient estimates remain statistically insignificant though. Also, without 
AB_RETURN, the performance gap widens by 100 percentage points for sample 3 and remains 
statistically significant at the 5% level. These large and conflicting swings raise concerns about the 
reliability of the two-step results. 
 
Column (2) shows that the inclusion of   generally widens the performance gap between grey 
insiders and outsiders by around 10 to 15 percentage points, except in the case of sample 2 where 
the gap widens by 54 percentage points - another wild swing. The performance difference remains 
statistically insignificant though. In column (3), I observe less volatile swings. With AB_RETURN, the 
performance gap between insiders and grey insiders widens by only 4 percentage points and 
remains statistically insignificant. Without AB_RETURN, the gap shrinks by around 10 to 25 
percentage points depending on the sample and remains statistically insignificant. In columns (1) 
through (3), the   coefficients are statistically insignificant, which provides some evidence that 
selection bias is not present in the previous section’s OLS findings. 
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Table 5.10: Second Step Results 
Table 5.10 summarises the regression outputs of equation (5.9). Panels A and B show the outputs with and 
without the use of AB_RETURN in the first step respectively. Equation (5.9) is estimated using OLS and the 
standard errors are adjusted for within firm correlation. The dependent variables is      , which equals 
winsorised      minus AB_RETURN if AB_RETURN is used in the first step regression, and winsorised     
otherwise. The independent variable of interest is CEO_ORIGIN, which equals INSIDER, GREY, and GREY in 
columns (1), (2), and (3) respectively. The control variables are EXCESS_MTB, SIZE, INDUSTRY (five dummy 
variables), MARKET, REGULATED, and   (the inverse Mills ratio). The “Without  ” rows show the CEO_ORIGIN 
outputs when   is excluded from equation (5.9); the “With  ” rows show the CEO_ORIGIN outputs when   is 
included; and the “ ” rows show the   outputs when   is included. The R-squared numbers refer to the 
regressions with  . The number outside the parenthesis is the coefficient estimate and the number inside the 
parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, checking whether the coefficient is statistically significant 
from 0. The variables and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 INSIDER relative  
to OUTSIDER  
GREY relative  
to OUTSIDER 
GREY relative  
to INSIDER 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: With AB_RETURN 
Without    35.74% (0.010) 14.85% (0.317) -26.22% (0.142) 
With   95.76% (0.071) 29.84% (0.306) -30.71% (0.567) 
   -42.84% (0.246) -11.08% (0.577) 3.02% (0.930) 
# Obs, R-squared 87, 0.244 89, 0.2824 60, 0.3916 
Panel B: Without AB_RETURN  
Sample 1 
Without    21.22% (0.110) 7.63% (0.594) -18.37% (0.163) 
With   -20.56% (0.796) 17.96% (0.727) -5.36% (0.905) 
   26.12% (0.592) -6.54% (0.818) -8.70% (0.754) 
# Obs, R-squared 123, 0.2411 119, 0.2777 80, 0.361 
Sample 2 
Without    19.85% (0.169) 3.42% (0.831) -17.62% (0.234) 
With   -80.52% (0.321) 10.11% (0.821) -5.54% (0.888) 
   62.46% (0.207) -4.38% (0.869) -8.39% (0.738) 
# Obs, R-squared 111, 0.2284 108, 0.2716 71, 0.3717 
Sample 3 
Without    31.68% (0.032) 10.83% (0.499) -26.85% (0.195) 
With   139.04% (0.050) 64.53% (0.157) -1.36% (0.980) 
   -69.17% (0.129) -36.37% (0.222) -17.38% (0.595) 
# Obs, R-squared 82, 0.2203 83, 0.2722 55, 0.3756 
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Overall, the inclusion of   does not change the statistical significance of the performance gaps but 
does change, and in some cases markedly, the magnitude of these gaps. As mentioned above, the 
wild swings in magnitude make me sceptical about the reliability of the two-step results. I concede 
that I may not have controlled for selection bias; perhaps my excluded variables are not strong 
enough. I heed the advice of Lennox et al. (2011) who review the two-step procedure and 
recommend that researchers, 
 
be more careful and rigorous in our implementation of selection models, 
particularly in the choice of exclusion restrictions. Further, because of the inherent 
limitations and fragility of selection models, we should also be much more 
circumspect with respect to claims about ‘‘controlling for selection bias.’’ (p. 590) 
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6 Lasting at Least Three Years 
 
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between CEO origin and the likelihood of lasting at least 
three years in the job. Before doing this examination, I explain the rationale and measurement of 
the above likelihood, outline the sample selection for this chapter’s analysis, and present some 
summary statistics and graphs of CEO tenure. 
 
6.1 Rationale and Measurement 
 
In the two previous chapters, the performance measures focus on shareholder wealth creation. For 
completeness, I analyse performance from another angle: does the CEO form a good or bad match 
with the firm? Following earlier studies (e.g., Allgood & Farrell, 2003; Zhang, 2008), I define a good 
match as a CEO who lasts at least three years in the job. CEOs who leave quickly are costly to the 
firm: before being replaced the firm probably performs poorly; and when replaced the firm faces 
disruption costs, which include coping with unstable and discontinuous leadership, paying severance 
remuneration, searching for and training the replacement CEO, and dealing with public scrutiny (e.g., 
why did the CEO leave so soon?, does the firm have a toxic culture?, are the directors incompetent?, 
etc.).35 Of  course, it would be unfair to classify all early leavers as bad matches because 
sometimes CEOs leave for reasons that are out of their control. I deal with such cases in the next 
section. 
 
      measures the likelihood that the CEO will last at least three years in the job, and is defined 
as follows:  
 
      {
         (                          )         
         (                          )         
                     
 
where 1 and 0 indicate good and bad matches respectively. The CEO’s starting and leaving dates are 
found using the process described in Appendix A.4. 
 
 
 
                                                             
35 Taylor (2010) finds that disruption costs (for firing a CEO) are significant: the cost to shareholders is around 
1.3% of the firm’s total assets.  
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6.2 Sample Selection 
 
I start with the 162 CEO appointments and sequentially put each appointment through the following 
criteria: 
(i) There must be sufficient information to measure      . Sometimes I cannot measure 
      when the firm delists (within the CEO’s first three years) and still employs the CEO 
at the time of delisting.36 This situation is problematic as delisted firms have no obligation to 
inform the public of CEO changes, so sometimes I cannot tell whether the CEO lasts three 
years or not (despite checking Factiva, Google, and the NZ Companies Office website). 
Measuring       is particularly difficult when a firm delists due to takeover; I now also 
need to determine whether the CEO is the top executive (i.e., still in the job) or just a senior 
executive of the merged company (i.e., out of the job).37 Overall this criterion reduces the 
sample by 13 appointments (3 insiders, 4 greys, and 6 outsiders).    
(ii) The initial plan must be to employ the CEO for at least three years. Specifically, the 
appointment announcement must not state anything to the contrary. This criterion ensures 
that CEOs who leave early are bad matches as opposed to good matches who always 
planned to leave. I do not need to worry about CEOs who always planned to retire - yet did 
not mention it in their appointment announcements - because no early leavers used 
retirement as the reason for leaving. This criterion reduces the sample by one appointment 
(a grey insider).38  
(iii) The reason for leaving within three years must be non-health related. This criterion ensures 
that CEOs who leave early are bad matches as opposed to unlucky good matches who got 
sick or died. This criterion reduces the sample by one appointment (an outsider).  
(iv) The reason for leaving within three years must be linked to the CEO. A couple of grey areas 
are as follows:  
a. The CEO leaves because his firm is partially (> 33% ownership) or fully taken over. An 
argument for keeping these appointments in the sample: the CEO may have run the 
company so poorly that acquirers believe they can buy it cheaply, replace the 
                                                             
36 If the firm delists due to receivership, I assume that the CEO loses his job at delisting. 
37
 For the appointed CEOs that fail (i), all but one of their firms delist due to a takeover by a non-NZX firm. 
Finding      information is much harder for non-NZX firms.  
38 The excluded grey insider is Steven Joyce who, according to his appointment announcement, always planned 
to leave Jasons Travel Media for politics. 
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management, and run it more efficiently (i.e., the CEO is a bad match and 
appropriately       equals 0). Arguments for excluding these appointments: 
firstly, the CEO may have deliberately and brilliantly positioned the company to be 
taken over, extracting a takeover premium, but is then replaced by the acquirer’s 
existing managers (i.e., the CEO is a good match and inappropriately      equals 
0); and secondly, it is plausible that the takeover is driven by other factors, such as 
strategic considerations or desirable market conditions, and has nothing (or very 
little) to do with the CEO. To rule out these latter arguments, I exclude CEOs who 
leave early because of takeovers (an insider, three grey insiders, and seven 
outsiders).39  
b. The CEO leaves because he has finished restructuring the firm. An argument for 
keeping these appointments in the sample: it is possible that the CEO is a bad match 
and the directors use the “restructuring complete” line as a face-saving excuse to rid 
themselves of him (i.e., the CEO is a bad match and appropriately        equals 
0); in support of this argument, none of the appointment announcements state that 
the CEO is hired to only restructure the firm - it is only mentioned in retrospect in 
the leaving announcements. An argument for excluding these appointments: despite 
not being in the appointment announcement, it is possible that the CEO has a 
mandate to restructure the firm and then resign (i.e., the CEO is a good match and 
inappropriately       equals 0). To rule out this latter argument, I exclude CEOs 
who leave early because of finished restructuring (an insider, a grey insider, and four 
outsiders).40 
 
To apply the above criteria, I require the leaving reason for those CEOs who leave within three years. 
To find this reason, I use a similar search process as that described for the leaving date (see 
Appendix A.4). This search process is supplemented with the NZX Company Research’s Substantial 
Holders tab, which lists by date significant changes in a firm’s ownership.41 The most common 
leaving reasons include change in controlling shareholder, “personal reasons”, “pursuing other 
                                                             
39  One of these CEOs leaves because of a firm split (instead of a takeover).  
40 One of these CEOs leaves for another reason. His leaving announcement - but not appointment 
announcement - states that it “was always envisaged that this would be a two to three year appointment”.   
41 The Substantial Holders tab is accessed as follows: on the NZX Company Research database, input the stock 
ticker in the top right corner search box and click the ‘Search’ button; then on the left hand side of the 
uploaded webpage click ‘Substantial Holders’.  
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interests”, “new direction of firm”, assigned to another role in firm or parent, firm in receivership, 
restructuring complete, and no reason given. When no reason is given, it is assumed that the 
appointment passes the above criteria (seven appointments).  
 
I use three samples: sample 1 passes criteria (i) through (iii), sample 2 passes criteria (i) through (iv), 
and sample 3 is the common sample. Sample 1 has 147 appointments, sample 2 has 130 
appointments, and sample 3 has 110 appointments. Figure 6.1 presents the CEO origin distribution 
of the three samples. As a reference point, I show the graph of the sample before any restrictions 
(the top left graph). As shown in the right graphs, the CEO origin distribution does not significantly 
change for sample 1 or 3. However, there is a noteworthy change for sample 2 - as shown in the 
bottom left graph, insiders increase their prevalence at the expense of grey insiders and outsiders.  
 
Figure 6.1: Samples of this Chapter’s Analysis 
 
Pre restrictions (top left), sample 1 (top right), sample 2 (bottom left), sample 3 (bottom right)    
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6.3 Tenure Statistics 
 
In this section, I study a relation of       - the number of years the CEO spends in the job. 
Specifically, I present some summary statistics and graphs around the tenure of NZ CEOs. This 
section sets the scene for later      analysis, and it also helps fill a gap in our knowledge of local 
executive practice - there are no statistics, to my knowledge, on NZ CEO tenure.   
 
Tenure statistics are calculated from sample j*, which is created with the following process: start 
with sample j and then extend sample j's selection criteria to those CEOs who last three or more 
years (for j equal to 1, 2, and 3). In other words, good match CEOs are excluded when their tenure 
cannot be measured (criterion (i*)), when they leave because of ill-health (criterion (iii*)), or when 
they leave because of a takeover or finished restructuring (criterion (iv*)).42 I create these new 
samples so that each appointed CEO, regardless of their tenure, is selected with the same respective 
criteria. This ensures clean tenure statistics. The new samples are smaller than their sample j 
counterparts: sample 1* excludes an additional 7 appointments (5 using criterion (i*) and 2 using 
criterion (iii*)); sample 2* excludes an additional 15 appointments (5 using criterion (i*), 2 using 
criterion (iii*), and 8 using criterion (iv*)); and sample 3* excludes an additional 4 appointments (4 
using criterion (i*)). To create these new samples, I collect some additional data: the leaving reasons 
for those CEOs who last three or more years. 
 
I present the summary statistics of tenure in Table 6.1 and display the distributions of tenure in 
Figure 6.2. The All rows of Table 6.1 show that CEOs in general have a mean (median) tenure of 
approximately 4.5 years (3.5 years). These averages are much lower than those observed overseas - 
for example, over a comparable sample period, Lucier et al. (2007) observe that global CEOs have a 
mean tenure that is “slightly” less than 7.8 years, and Falato et al. (2009) observe that US CEOs have 
a median tenure of 7.7 years. This NZ-overseas difference can be partially explained by the following 
data modification: as mentioned in footnote 42, I prematurely end the tenures of 23 CEOs in 
samples 1* and 2* and 18 CEOs in sample 3*; this artificially lowers NZ’s mean, but does not affect 
                                                             
42 There is a caveat to criterion (i*). I include those CEOs who remain in the job as at 14 April 2014 even though 
they have not finished their tenure. I artificially set their leaving dates to 14 April 2014 so that I can calculate 
their tenures. This is done for 23 CEOs (10 insiders, 3 grey insiders, and 10 outsiders) in samples 1* and 2* and 
for 18 CEOs in sample 3* (8 insiders, 3 grey insiders, and 7 outsiders). I include these CEOs so that I do not lose 
too many observations and so that I do not downwards bias the tenure statistics - these CEOs all last longer 
than average.  
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NZ’s median because all these CEOs last longer than average. Finding a full explanation for NZ’s low 
average tenure is beyond the scope of this thesis but provides an interesting challenge for future 
research. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Tenure 
Table 6.1 presents the summary statistics of tenure, which is measured in years. Panels A, B, and C show the 
statistics for samples 1*, 2*, and 3* respectively. The samples are defined at the start of this section and the 
CEO origins in Appendix A.1. 
 # Obs Mean Median Stdev Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Sample 1* 
All 140 4.3 3.2 3.4 0.5 15.9 
Insider 37 6.4 6.6 3.8 0.6 15.9 
Grey Insider 31 3.5 3.2 3.0 0.6 14.5 
Outsider 72 3.6 2.3 2.9 0.5 14.0 
Panel B: Sample 2* 
All 115 4.7 3.7 3.6 0.5 15.9 
Insider 32 6.7 6.9 3.8 0.6 15.9 
Grey Insider 25 3.7 3.2 3.2 0.6 14.5 
Outsider 58 3.9 2.4 3.2 0.5 14.0 
Panel C: Sample 3* 
All 106 4.5 3.5 3.5 0.5 15.9 
Insider 26 6.6 7.0 3.8 0.6 15.9 
Grey Insider 27 3.6 3.2 3.2 0.6 14.5 
Outsider 53 4.0 2.7 3.1 0.5 14.0 
 
The All rows of Table 6.1 also document a large range: the shortest tenure is 0.5 years and the 
longest is just under 16 years. In the All plots of Figure 6.2, I show that the general tenure 
distribution is weighted towards the left - around 45% of appointments last three or less years, and 
surprisingly the most common tenure is between one and two years. I also discover that the large 
majority of CEOs leave before the eight year mark (approximately 85%). However, I should mention 
that 11 CEOs in samples 1* and 2* and 8 CEOs in sample 3* are recorded as leaving between five 
and eight years even though they remain employed as at 14 April 2014.   
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Figure 6.2: Distributions of Tenure 
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I find that insiders easily have the highest mean (around 6.5 years) and median tenures (around 6.8 
years). The insider distribution spreads evenly over the whole tenure range with the most common 
tenure being six to eight years. Grey insiders and outsiders have roughly the same mean (around 3.7 
years), but the former has a higher median (around 3.2 versus 2.4 years). The grey insider 
distribution is weighted towards the left - most grey insiders do not last five years (approximately 
80%). Finally, the majority of outsiders are bad matches - around 57% of outsiders last three or less 
years, whereas only around 18% of insiders and around 43% of grey insiders do likewise. The 
summary statistics and graphs support the following tenure and       relations: insiders >> greys 
>= outsiders. 
 
6.4 Bivariate Analysis 
 
Table 6.2 presents the bivariate      results. In columns (1) through (4), I display the percentage 
of CEOs who are good matches. Column (1) shows that approximately 60% of CEOs in general are 
good matches.43 This percentage is lower than that reported in the US - for example, Allgood and 
Farrell (2003) examine CEO successions between 1981 and 1993 and report a percentage of 79%; 
and Zhang (2008) examines CEO successions between 1993 and 1998 and reports a percentage of 
76%.44 Unfortunately, these studies use different sample periods to that used in this thesis, so the 
percentages are not directly comparable. However, when I use my most comparable sample - 
sample 2’s 1992 to 1998 appointments - I calculate a percentage of approximately 62%; the different 
periods do not account for the NZ-US difference. Columns (2) through (4) show that a lot of insiders 
(around 83%), most grey insiders (around 60%), and not so many outsiders (around 45%) are good 
matches. In comparison, Allgood and Farrell find that approximately 81% of insiders and 70% of 
outsiders are good matches; and Favaro, Karlsson, and Neilson (2012) study CEO successions from 
the world’s 2,500 largest public companies between 2000 and 2011, and find that 84% of insiders 
and 78% of outsiders are good matches. Outsiders in NZ are much less likely than their overseas 
counterparts to last three years.  
  
In the final three columns of Table 6.2, I display the differences in percentages and the p-values of 
the differences. Column (5) shows that insiders are more likely to be good matches than grey 
                                                             
43
 The       figures in this section are slightly different to those in the previous section because the two 
sections use different samples.  
44 Zhang (2008) explicitly reports a percentage of 73%. However, this percentage increases to 76% when she 
excludes CEOs who leave because of ill-health or merger.  
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insiders; the difference is around 23 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 5% level 
for sample 1 and at the 10% level for samples 2 and 3. In column (6), I document that insiders are 
also more likely to be good matches than outsiders; the difference is around 38 percentage points 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level for all samples. Finally, column (7) reveals that grey 
insiders are more likely to last three years than outsiders, but the difference is statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Table 6.2: Bivariate Results 
Table 6.2 presents the results of the bivariate analysis. In columns (1) through (4), the number is the 
percentage of good matches (i.e., the percentage of CEOs who last at least three years). In columns (5) through 
(7), the number outside the parenthesis is the difference in the respective percentages, and the number inside 
the parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed z-test, testing whether the difference is statistically significant 
from 0. The CEO origins and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively.  
 All Insider 
Grey 
Insider 
Outsider 
Difference 
(2) - (3) 
Difference  
(2) - (4) 
Difference  
(3) - (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample 1 56% 82% 58% 41% 
24% 
(0.037) 
41% 
(0.000) 
17% 
(0.117) 
Sample 2 63% 86% 66% 48% 
20% 
(0.080) 
38% 
(0.000) 
18% 
(0.114) 
Sample 3 58% 81% 57% 47% 
24% 
(0.067) 
34% 
(0.003) 
10% 
(0.389) 
 
Overall, the bivariate findings confirm most of the previous section’s observations. There is strong 
support for insiders outperforming outsiders, some support for insiders outperforming grey insiders, 
and no significant support for grey insiders outperforming outsiders. These findings must be 
interpreted with caution, however, as simple bivariate comparisons do not control for factors that 
may be correlated with CEO origin and      . In the next section, I control for such factors and 
isolate the effect of CEO origin on     . 
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6.5 Regression Analysis 
 
I estimate the following regressions: 
 
          (       )   (    )   (    )   (        )    (      )  
 (     )   (          )                                                                                                  ( 6.1 ) 
 
          (        )   (    )   (    )   (        )    (      )  
 (     )   (          )                                                                                                 ( 6.2 ) 
 
INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER are dummy variables, which are set equal to 1 if the appointment is 
an insider, grey insider, or outsider respectively, and 0 otherwise; the CEO origin classification is 
outlined in section 3.2. (6.1) gives the performance of insiders and grey insiders relative to outsiders, 
whereas (6.2) gives the performance of outsiders and grey insiders relative to insiders; estimating 
(6.1) and (6.2) ensures that each CEO origin is compared with the other two. I estimate (6.1) and 
(6.2) with a binary logit model and adjust the standard errors for within firm correlation. 
 
I also estimate (6.1) and (6.2) without EXCESS_PAY to preserve sample sizes. As alluded to in 
Appendix A.5, the regressions with EXCESS_PAY have significantly smaller sample sizes: sample 1 
goes from 147 to 105 appointments, sample 2 goes from 130 to 95, and sample 3 goes from 110 to 
78. In these smaller samples the insider proportion increases by approximately 6% and the grey 
insider and outsider proportions each decrease by approximately 3%.  
 
6.5.1 Control Variables 
 
SIZE measures the appointing firm’s size (see section 4.4.1). I control for SIZE because the likelihood 
of CEO turnover increases with firm size (e.g., Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Huson et al., 2001; Warner 
et al., 1988); and because smaller firms have less insider candidates and so are more likely to hire 
outsider candidates (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Lauterbach et al., 1999; 
Parrino, 1997). 
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INDUSTRY indicates the appointing firm’s industry at the time of the appointment announcement 
(see section 4.4.1).45 INDUSTRY is important because the rate of CEO turnover varies between 
industries (e.g., Favaro et al., 2012; Parrino, 1997). INDUSTRY may also be correlated with CEO 
origin. Different industries may seek different levels of specific and generic skills and hence favour 
different CEO origins. Also, Parrino (1997) finds that more competitive industries are more likely to 
hire outsiders.  
 
As defined in section 5.6.2, PERIOD roughly indicates the year of the CEO’s starting date.46 I control 
for PERIOD because the rate of CEO turnover (in other countries) has increased over this thesis’s 
sample period (e.g., Kaplan & Minton, 2012; Lucier et al., 2007); and because each CEO origin is 
more prevalent in different periods (as shown in section 3.3). 
 
PRIOR captures the appointing firm’s performance prior to the appointment announcement (see 
section 4.4.1). As explained in Appendix A.5, I cannot measure PRIOR for one appointment (an 
outsider) which reduces the size of samples 1 and 2. I expect PRIOR to be positively correlated with 
     : CEOs who inherit struggling (i.e., low PRIOR) firms face more trials - their firms probably 
have a higher ex-ante probability of going bankrupt and their directors probably demand quick (and 
perhaps unrealistic) improvements in firm performance. PRIOR is also likely correlated with CEO 
origin; several studies find that thriving firms hire more insiders and struggling firms hire more 
outsiders (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2006; Ang & Nagel, 2009; Parrino, 1997). 
 
EXCESS_PAY measures the CEO’s initial pay relative to that of other CEOs from similar sized and 
same industry firms. Specifically, EXCESS_PAY is the residual (i.e.,  ) in the following OLS regression: 
 
    (   )        (    )    (        )                  
 
where SIZE and INDUSTRY are defined above. PAY is the CEO’s initial remuneration, which is 
measured in June 2012 dollars. I take the log of PAY to mitigate the effect of outliers. Appendix A.5 
discusses the measurement of PAY and explains why PAY (and hence EXCESS_PAY) cannot be 
measured for 52 appointments (7 insiders, 17 grey insiders, and 28 outsiders). EXCESS_PAY is 
important because CEOs may leave early because of underpayment rather than bad match; and 
                                                             
45
 The PROPERTY dummy variable is excluded from the regressions that control for EXCESS_PAY. I do this 
because these regressions only have one or two appointments from the property industry. 
46 The PERIOD1 dummy variable is excluded from the regressions that control for EXCESS_PAY. I do this 
because these regressions have no appointments from the 1991 to 1993 period.  
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because outsiders generally receive more initial remuneration than insiders (e.g., Agrawal et al., 
2006; Harris & Helfat, 1997; Murphy & Zabojnik, 2006).  
 
Table 6.3 presents the summary statistics of the control variables. The summary statistics are based 
on the entire thesis sample rather than the more restricted samples of this chapter. I only show the 
summary statistics of PAY and EXCESS_PAY because those of SIZE, INDUSTRY, and PRIOR are 
presented in Table 4.4 and those of PERIOD are presented in section 3.3.47 The PAY row of Table 6.3 
reveals that the mean (median) CEO remuneration is around $700k ($484k). There is a large range in 
CEO remuneration: one CEO receives a measly $165k while another receives a whopping $3.2m. The 
PAY row also shows that grey insiders are easily paid the most on average. Outsiders have higher 
mean PAY than insiders (as expected), but have lower median PAY; a discrepancy that can be 
explained by the high standard deviation and range of outsider PAY. Finally, the EXCESS_PAY 
statistics reveal that grey insiders and especially outsiders receive more industry-and-size-adjusted 
remuneration than insiders.  
 
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics of the Control Variables 
Table 6.3 presents the summary statistics of the control variables. The summary statistics are based on the 
entire thesis sample rather than the more restricted samples of this chapter. The table only shows the 
summary statistics of PAY and EXCESS_PAY because those of SIZE, INDUSTRY, and PRIOR are presented in 
Table 4.4 and those of PERIOD are presented in section 3.3. The CEO origins and control variables are defined 
in Appendix A.1. 
 # Obs  Mean  Median  Stdev  Minimum Maximum 
PAY ($000) 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
110 
35 
21 
54 
 
700 
684 
749 
691 
 
484 
494 
536 
433 
 
563 
476 
456 
653 
 
165 
213 
231 
165 
 
3235 
1944 
1728 
3235 
EXCESS_PAY 
All 
Insiders 
Grey Insiders 
Outsiders 
 
110 
35 
21 
54 
 
0.00 
     -0.04 
     -0.03 
       0.04 
 
-0.02 
-0.04 
 0.01 
-0.01 
 
0.18 
0.13 
0.19 
0.19 
 
-0.37 
-0.24 
-0.37 
-0.30 
 
0.72 
0.33 
0.31 
0.72 
 
                                                             
47
 The PERIOD statistics slightly differ from the section 3.3 statistics. The PERIOD statistics are based on the 
year of the CEO’s starting date, whereas the section 3.3 statistics are based on the year of the CEO’s 
appointment announcement date. The years only differ for 13 appointments so the two sets of statistics are 
similar enough for discussion purposes.   
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6.5.2 Regression Results 
 
Before presenting the regression results, I check for multicollinearity. I calculate the correlations 
between each pair of independent variables and display the results for sample 1 (with EXCESS_PAY) 
in Table 6.4; I do not display the correlation tables for the other samples (with or without 
EXCESS_PAY) as they are similar to Table 6.4. Table 6.4 shows that the independent variables are not 
highly correlated with each other, so multicollinearity is not a problem.48 In fact, the correlations are 
all smaller than |0.6| except those among the CEO origin variables. 
  
Table 6.5 summarises the regression results. In columns (2) through (4), I present the marginal 
effects and p-values of the INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER variables.49 Column (2) confirms that 
insiders are more likely to be good matches than outsiders: the difference is around 37 percentage 
points and is statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level depending on the sample. This finding 
partially supports those of comparable studies: Zhang (2008) finds that insiders are less likely to be 
dismissed within their first three years, while Allgood and Farrell (2003) find that insiders are as 
likely as outsiders to be good matches. Column (3) reveals no significant differences between grey 
insiders and outsiders. In Column (4), I show that insiders are more likely to be good matches than 
grey insiders. In the regressions without EXCESS_PAY, the difference is around 35 percentage points 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level. In the regressions with EXCESS_PAY, however, the 
difference decreases to around 22 percentage points and is only significant at the 10% level for 
sample 2. 
 
Table 6.6 presents the full regression outputs of equation (6.1); those of equation (6.2) are 
omitted as they do not add anything new except the performance of grey insiders relative to 
outsiders which is documented in Table 6.5. SIZE’s coefficients are consistently positive, which is a 
surprise. However, they are only statistically significant for sample 2 - a marginal effect of around 
12%. In the regressions with EXCESS_PAY, none of the INDUSTRY coefficients are statistically 
significant for more than one sample. Without EXCESS_PAY, primary has a marginal effect of 
around -35%, which is statistically significant for samples 1 and 2; and goods has a marginal effect  
                                                             
48
 As mentioned earlier, PROPERTY and PERIOD1 are excluded from regressions that control for EXCESS_PAY. 
Hence, Table 17 does not show the correlations of PROPERTY and PERIOD1; but I can report that their 
correlations are also low enough. 
49 The p-values are from the logit regression outputs rather than the marginal effects outputs.  
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Table 6.4: Correlations between Independent Variables 
Table 6.4 shows the correlations between the independent variables of sample 1 (with EXCESS_PAY). The correlation tables for the other samples (with and without 
EXCESS_PAY) are similar to Table 6.4. The independent variables and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. INSIDER 1.00              
2. GREY -0.34 1.00             
3. OUTSIDER -0.69 -0.45 1.00            
4. SIZE 0.09 0.22 -0.25 1.00           
5. PRIMARY 0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.07 1.00          
6. ENERGY -0.13 0.22 -0.05 0.23 -0.21 1.00         
7. GOODS 0.02 -0.14 0.08 -0.30 -0.17 -0.10 1.00        
8. SERVICES 0.07 -0.12 0.02 0.08 -0.57 -0.35 -0.28 1.00       
9. PERIOD2 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.10 -0.08 0.12 1.00      
10. PERIOD3 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.08 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 1.00     
11. PERIOD4 -0.09 0.34 -0.18 0.23 -0.11 0.21 -0.05 0.06 -0.13 -0.20 1.00    
12. PERIOD5 0.17 -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.13 0.18 -0.01 -0.15 -0.23 -0.27 1.00   
13. PRIOR 0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 1.00  
14. EXCESS_PAY -0.16 -0.10 0.23 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.24 -0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.00 
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of around -55%, which is statistically significant for all samples. The PERIOD, PRIOR, and EXCESS_PAY 
coefficients have mixed signs and cannot be statistically distinguished from 0. The regressions with 
EXCESS_PAY have an average sensitivity and specificity of around 88% and 46% respectively; and the 
regressions without EXCESS_PAY have averages of around 75% and 57% respectively.  
 
Table 6.5: Summarised Regression Results 
Table 6.5 summarises the results of the regression analysis. Panels A and B show the results with and without 
the EXCESS_PAY control respectively. Equations (6.1) and (6.2) are estimated with a binary logit model and the 
standard errors are adjusted for within firm correlation. The dependent variable is       (the likelihood of 
the CEO lasting at least three years). The independent variables of interest are INSIDER, GREY, and OUTSIDER. 
The control variables are SIZE, INDUSTRY, PERIOD, PRIOR, and EXCESS_PAY. In columns (2) through (4), the 
number outside the parenthesis is the marginal effect of INSIDER in equation (6.1), GREY in equation (6.1), and 
GREY in equation (6.2) respectively; and the number inside the parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed t-
test, checking whether the logit coefficient is statistically significant from 0 (i.e., the p-value is from the logit 
regression output rather than the marginal effects output). The variables and samples are defined in 
Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively.  
 
Overall, the regression analysis confirms the bivariate findings: there is strong support for insiders 
outperforming outsiders, some support for insiders outperforming grey insiders, and no significant  
 
 # Obs 
INSIDER relative to 
OUTSIDER 
GREY relative to 
OUTSIDER 
GREY relative to 
INSIDER 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: With EXCESS_PAY 
Sample 1 104 38.66% (0.003) 19.54% (0.130) -19.11% (0.244) 
Sample 2 94 33.51% (0.002) 9.97% (0.405) -23.53% (0.099) 
Sample 3 78 41.93% (0.041) 18.36% (0.146) -23.57% (0.252) 
Panel B: Without EXCESS_PAY  
Sample 1 146 38.62% (0.001) 4.87% (0.656) -33.75% (0.027) 
Sample 2 129 38.12% (0.001) 4.05% (0.727) -34.07% (0.032) 
Sample 3 110 38.01% (0.010) -0.33% (0.978) -38.35% (0.025) 
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support for grey insiders outperforming outsiders. These findings support those of the previous 
chapter: insiders are generally the best medium term performers. 
 
Table 6.6: Full Regression Results 
Table 6.6 presents the full regression outputs of equation (6.1); those of equation (6.2) are omitted as they do 
not add anything new except the performance of grey insiders relative to outsiders which is documented in 
Table 6.5. Panels A and B show the regression outputs with and without EXCESS_PAY respectively. Equation 
(6.1) is estimated with a binary logit model and the standard errors are adjusted for within firm correlation. 
Equation (6.1)’s dependent variable is       (the likelihood of the CEO lasting at least three years). The 
independent variables of interest are INSIDER and GREY. The control variables are SIZE, INDUSTRY (five dummy 
variables), PERIOD (five dummy variables), and EXCESS_PAY. The number outside the parenthesis is the 
marginal effect estimate and the number inside the parentheses is the p-value of a two tailed t-test, checking 
whether the logit coefficient is statistically significant from 0 (i.e., the p-value is from the logit regression 
output rather than the marginal effects output). The intercept is not shown because it does not have a 
marginal effect. The variables and samples are defined in Appendices A.1 and A.2 respectively. 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Panel A: With EXCESS_PAY 
INSIDER 38.66% (0.003) 33.51% (0.002) 41.93% (0.041) 
GREY 19.54% (0.130) 9.97% (0.405) 18.36% (0.146) 
SIZE 7.03% (0.256) 13.07% (0.012) 1.78% (0.798) 
PRIMARY -20.26% (0.256) -33.57% (0.077) -18.84% (0.401) 
ENERGY -11.80% (0.585) -26.26% (0.205) -27.63% (0.261) 
GOODS -7.22% (0.727) -22.33% (0.420) -19.89% (0.401) 
SERVICES -10.96% (0.540) -27.73% (0.143) -15.61% (0.488) 
PERIOD2 5.82% (0.725) 9.90% (0.654) 11.73% (0.598) 
PERIOD3 5.88% (0.675) 14.14% (0.241) -1.35% (0.925) 
PERIOD4 -7.29% (0.564) -5.98% (0.608) -11.73% (0.379) 
PERIOD5 1.88% (0.883) 14.65% (0.224) -0.59% (0.973) 
PRIOR -4.86% (0.701) -6.38% (0.506) -10.59% (0.458) 
EXCESS_PAY -3.41% (0.890) -24.63% (0.223) 5.84% (0.821) 
# Obs 104 94 78 
Sensitivity 84% 90% 91% 
Specificity  57% 44% 38% 
77 
 
Panel B: Without EXCESS_PAY  
INSIDER 38.62% (0.001) 38.12% (0.001) 38.01% (0.010) 
GREY 4.87% (0.656) 4.05% (0.727) -0.33% (0.978) 
SIZE 7.86% (0.172) 12.12% (0.018) 1.71% (0.801) 
PRIMARY -39.38% (0.051) -33.26% (0.085) -40.86% (0.105) 
ENERGY -33.54% (0.116) -32.27% (0.106) -50.28% (0.057) 
GOODS -49.51% (0.027) -48.17% (0.040) -66.79% (0.009) 
PROPERTY -33.48% (0.253) -16.45% (0.603) -32.29% (0.315) 
SERVICES -33.01% (0.081) -30.29% (0.101) -37.82% (0.117) 
PERIOD1 15.92% (0.470) 31.09% (0.180) 14.92% (0.526) 
PERIOD2 -3.54% (0.807) -4.14% (0.779) -1.74% (0.920) 
PERIOD3 1.91% (0.878) 7.30% (0.581) 2.21% (0.872) 
PERIOD4 8.07% (0.442) 5.36% (0.634) 8.71% (0.488) 
PERIOD5 4.28% (0.723) 13.93% (0.271) -0.99% (0.944) 
PRIOR 8.07% (0.489) 4.39% (0.714) 6.62% (0.621) 
# Obs 146 129 110 
Sensitivity 73% 83% 70% 
Specificity  68% 48% 54% 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between CEO origin and performance consequences in a NZ 
setting. The NZ setting is unique because previous research on this topic is from the US and in one 
instance the UK; and the NZ setting is intriguing because it has four important institutional 
differences: NZ directors hire outsiders much more frequently than their US and UK counterparts; NZ 
has no discernible trend in the frequency of outsider appointments over time, whereas the US has a 
marked upward trend; average CEO tenure in NZ is much shorter than that observed in the US or 
globally; and CEO succession occurs in relatively small firms. These four differences suggest that the 
NZ CEO market has some unique dynamics and perhaps unique performance consequences. This 
thesis fills a gap in our knowledge of executive and director practice in NZ and contributes to the 
CEO origin debate by analysing a new setting. 
 
Using a hand collected sample of 162 CEO appointments from NZ firms between 1991 and 2008, I 
find some significant performance differences between insiders and outsiders. Outsiders deliver 
higher abnormal returns around the appointment announcement: the 1-day and the 3-day 
differentials are approximately 1.2% and 1.7% respectively. In contrast, insiders create more 
shareholder wealth during their first three years in charge: insiders increase the appointing firm’s 
MTB ratio by approximately 27 percentage points more than outsiders. I also find that insiders are 
around 37 percentage points more likely to last at least three years in the job. The main difference 
between these findings and those from the US and UK is that insiders easily outperform outsiders in 
the medium term. Also, I discover an intuitive finding for grey insiders: grey insiders by definition 
possess a blend of insider and outsider attributes and perform between insiders and outsiders on all 
three performance measures. These findings are robust to various controls and subsamples. 
 
The above findings raise an interesting question: why do directors and investors often prefer 
outsiders initially when outsiders generally underperform in the medium term? A possible 
explanation is that the underperformance of outsiders is spurious and results from an omitted 
variable bias. There may be unobservable factors that increase the chance of low performance and 
outsider appointment. For example, selection bias may be present: directors may systematically 
select outsiders when they know that firm prospects are poor - poorer than perhaps investors 
realise. The medium term performance of outsiders may reflect not only their own actions but also 
their firm’s unobservable poor prospects; the performance of outsiders may be biased downwards. I 
attempt to control for selection bias in section 5.6 but only have limited success.  
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Another possible omitted variable story involves an unobservable risk factor. An unobservable risk 
factor may explain why outsiders have higher appointment announcement abnormal returns and yet 
lower changes in the MTB ratio. For example, outsider appointments may lower firm systematic risk 
along some unobservable dimension, which leads to a lower cost of capital and hence a higher 
contemporaneous share price and a lower long run expected return. In other words, the medium 
term performance of outsiders may reflect not only their own actions but also their low 
unobservable risk and low expected return; the performance of outsiders may be biased 
downwards.  
 
A second possible explanation is that directors irrationally favour outsider candidates. Khurana 
(2002a) provides support for this explanation. After analysing the hiring and firing of CEOs at 850 of 
America’s largest companies between 1978 and 1999, and after conducting extensive interviews 
with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms, Khurana concludes 
that directors systematically overestimate the ability of outsider candidates. Specifically, he argues 
that directors are irrationally attracted to “superstars” - outsider candidates who are charismatic 
and come from high performing and high stature companies.  
 
According to Khurana (2002a), this irrational attraction stems from three causes. First, directors 
overly attribute outcomes to leaders: superstars are given too much credit for their firm’s high 
performance, whereas other performance factors such as luck, economic environment, or industry 
conditions are not given enough credit by directors. Second, directors incorrectly assume that an 
executive’s success at one firm will readily transfer to their firm; directors don’t fully appreciate that 
different firms often require different skills. Third, boards want to appoint a CEO with as much star 
power as possible because a high profile, high status appointment will most likely inspire public 
confidence in the firm and immediately boost share prices.     
 
Even though a superstar’s fame and personality may initially impress analysts and business media, 
Khurana (2002a) argues that superstar appointments generally disappoint in the long run. The 
irrational quest for superstars causes directors to overlook superior candidates, whose experience 
and abilities are better suited to the appointing firm. Ultimately, the mismatch between the 
superstar’s skills and the firm’s needs results in poor performance. In summary, Khurana (2002b) 
states that, “[t]ime and again over the past 20 years, corporate boards have seen the superstars they 
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had hoped would be saviors turn into black holes that sucked the energy and purpose out of their 
organizations” (p.66).  
 
Investigating the validity of the above explanations is beyond the scope of this thesis but provides an 
interesting challenge for future research. This investigation may shed more light on CEO origin and 
CEO performance within NZ firms.  
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A Appendices 
 
A.1 Variable Definitions  
 
Variable Definition 
INSIDER INSIDER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the appointment is an insider and 0 
otherwise. Immediately prior to the appointment, insiders are executives of the 
appointing firm and have worked at the firm for at least a year.  
GREY GREY is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the appointment is a grey insider and 0 
otherwise. Grey insiders are any of the following: 
 Immediately prior to the appointment, executives of the appointing firm who 
have worked at the firm for less than a year (i.e., recently hired executives). 
 Immediately prior to the appointment, executives of another firm who have 
worked at the appointing firm at some stage during the five years leading up 
to the appointment (i.e., former executives). 
 Non-executive directors of the appointing firm who served at some stage 
during the five years leading up to the appointment. 
 Executives or non-executive directors of a major shareholder of the 
appointing firm. These candidates must have held these positions 
immediately prior to the appointment. A major shareholder is defined as 
owning at least 40% of the appointing firm at the time of the appointment 
announcement. 
OUTSIDER OUTSIDER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the appointment is an outsider and 0 
otherwise. Outsiders have no obvious and/or recent connection with the appointing 
firm.  
      is the winsorised appointment announcement abnormal return. 
SIZE SIZE measures the appointing firm’s size. SIZE is equal to log(ASSET), where ASSET is 
the book value of the firm’s total assets measured at the CEO’s starting date and then 
converted to June 2012 dollars. 
INDUSTRY INDUSTRY indicates the appointing firm’s industry at the time of the appointment 
announcement. INDUSTRY consists of five dummy variables that are based on the six 
broad NZX industry classifications: energy, goods, primary, property, services, and 
investment (the excluded dummy). 
PRIOR PRIOR measures the appointing firm’s performance prior to the appointment 
announcement. PRIOR is the firm’s stock return minus the NZX All’s stock return over 
the 12 months prior to the appointment announcement. 
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          is the 3-year change in the appointing firm’s market-to-book ratio and  is 
measured as: 
     
                   
          
 
where  
     
                       
            
                          
where                       and             are the firm’s time t market value 
of equity and book value of equity respectively. 
EXCESS_MTB EXCESS_MTB measures the appointing firm’s initial MTB ratio relative to those of 
other firms in the same industry.  EXCESS_MTB is the residual (i.e.,  ) in the following 
OLS regression: 
                 (        )                 
where           and INDUSTRY are defined above.  
MARKET MARKET measures the share market’s return over the CEO’s performance period. 
MARKET is the real return of the NZX All Index (i.e., NZX All return minus CPI 
percentage change) measured over the period of     . 
REGULATED REGULATED is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the appointing firm is regulated at 
the time of appointment announcement, and 0 otherwise. 
PERIOD PERIOD roughly indicates the year of the CEO’s starting date. It consists of five dummy 
variables that are based on 3-year blocks: 1991 to 1993 (PERIOD1), 1994 to 1996 
(PERIOD2), 1997 to 1999 (PERIOD3), 2000 to 2002 (PERIOD4), 2003 to 2005 
(PERIOD5), and 2006 to 2008 (PERIOD6, the excluded dummy). 
BOARD_DEP BOARD_DEP measures the dependence of the appointing firm’s board of directors. 
BOARD_DEP is the proportion of directors who are firm executives at the time of the 
CEO appointment announcement. 
AB_RETURN AB_RETURN is the winsorised 1-day appointment announcement abnormal return. 
            measures the likelihood that the CEO will last at least three years in the job, 
and is defined as follows:  
      {
         (                          )         
         (                          )         
                     
where 1 and 0 indicate good and bad matches respectively. The starting and leaving 
dates are the appointed CEO’s first and last day in the job respectively.  
EXCESS_PAY EXCESS_PAY measures the CEO’s initial pay relative to that of other CEOs from similar 
sized and same industry firms. EXCESS_PAY is the residual (i.e.,  ) in the following OLS 
regression: 
    (   )        (    )     (        )                  
where SIZE and INDUSTRY are defined above, and PAY is the CEO’s initial 
remuneration measured in June 2012 dollars. 
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A.2 Sample Definitions 
 
Samples of Chapter 4: Appointment Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Sample Definition 
Sample 1 Appointments in this sample pass the following criteria:  
(i) There must be a trade in the event window. A trade must occur on day 0 or 
day +1 in the 3-day window.  
(ii) The stock must trade at least 30 times between day -210 and day -11. 
(iii) There must be no ‘obvious’ confounding announcements in the event 
window. ‘Obvious’ includes the following announcements: earnings results or 
updates, significant project updates, mergers, or movements in significant 
substantial shareholders. 
Sample 2 Appointments in this sample pass the above (i) through (iii) and the following criterion: 
(iv) There must be no ‘perhaps’ confounding announcements in the event 
window. ‘Perhaps’ includes the following announcements: CEO departures or 
directorship changes. 
Sample 3 Sample 3 is the common sample - it is used in the analysis of all three performance 
measures. Sample 3 passes the above (i) through (iii), (i) of Chapter 5 (see below), and 
(i) through (iii) of Chapter 6 (see below). 
 
 
Samples of Chapter 5: Change in the Market-to-Book Ratio 
Sample Definition 
Sample 1 Appointments in this sample pass the following criterion:  
(i) There must be sufficient data to measure     .  
Sample 2 Appointments in this sample pass the above (i) and the following criterion: 
(ii) The       is not measured early because of a takeover. 
Sample 3 As explained in the above table, sample 3 is the common sample. I use the common 
sample of the 1-day (rather than the 3-day) event window because it is slightly larger.  
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Samples of Chapter 6: Lasting at Least Three Years 
Sample Definition 
Sample 1 Appointments in this sample pass the following criteria:  
(i) There must be sufficient information to measure     .  
(ii) The initial plan must be to employ the CEO for at least three years. The 
appointment announcement must not state anything to the contrary. 
(iii) The reason for leaving within three years must be non-health related. 
Sample 2 Appointments in this sample pass the above (i) through (iii) and the following criterion: 
(iv) The reason for leaving within three years must be linked to the CEO; the CEO 
must not leave within three years because of a takeover or finished 
restructuring. 
Sample 3 As explained in the above table, sample 3 is the common sample. I use the common 
sample of the 1-day (rather than the 3-day) event window because it is slightly larger. 
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A.3 Data Collection for Abnormal Returns 
 
For each appointment, I perform the following data collection process:  
(i) Within the Adjusted Share Prices Tool section of the NZX Company Research database, I 
input the appointing firm’s stock ticker, leave the date inputs as they are, and click ‘Go’.50 A 
spreadsheet is downloaded which contains a time series of the firm’s share price and other 
trading statistics. The Gross Adjusted Price column - which contains the firm’s daily closing 
share price adjusted for corporate actions and dividends - is copied for days -210 to +10.51 
The Volume column is also copied for these dates. The price and volume data are pasted into 
my spreadsheet.  
(ii) This step is done once (rather than for each appointment). On the NZX Company Research 
database, I go to Indices, then Historical Values, and then NZX All. I click ‘All’ under Quick 
Select, and this gives a time series of NZX All statistics over all available dates. The Date 
column and the Gross Index Close column - which contains the index’s daily closing price 
adjusted for dividends - are copied for all dates. The date and price data are pasted into my 
spreadsheet.  
(iii) From the NZX All price column in my spreadsheet, I copy the days -210 to +10 for the 
respective appointment. This data is pasted next to the firm’s share price and volume data. 
 
The following process, done for each appointment, converts the copied data into a trade-to-trade 
format:  
(i) Trade-to-trade returns only use share prices from days with positive volume. Therefore, I 
delete firm share prices that are associated with zero volume. Specifically, these cells in 
Excel are left blank rather than completely deleted because I need to know (in the below 
step) when no trades occurred. The NZX All prices are blanked out for the same days.   
(ii) I create a variable    which is defined as follows: 1 plus the number of zero volume trading 
days between t and the previous positive volume day. For example, the    for Thursday is 3 
if the stock traded on Monday and Thursday but not on Tuesday or Wednesday. For days 
                                                             
50 This step only works with the stock’s most recent ticker, which is found using the following process: (a) on 
the NZX Company Research database, input the old stock ticker in the top right-hand corner search box and 
click ‘Search’; (b) on the left-hand side of the uploaded webpage, click ‘Events & Documents’. If this process 
fails I use Google.  
51 A few firms list on the NZX within the -210 days, so I cannot copy their data for the whole period. Instead, I 
copy their data from their listing date to +10.  
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when the share price cell is blank, the corresponding     cell is also left blank. After 
completing this step, I have a column of    values for each appointment, containing 
matching gaps with the firm and NZX All price columns. 
(iii) Finally, I remove the gaps in the firm’s share price, NZX All price, and     columns. The 
columns have matching gaps, so when the gaps are removed the data stays aligned for a 
given day. The gaps are removed to make life easier when regressions are run. The data is 
now ready to be analysed. 
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A.4 Data Collection for Change in the Market-to-Book Ratio 
 
For each appointment, I perform the following data collection process: 
(i) As alluded to in section 5.1, I need to answer three questions:  
(a) Is the CEO still in the job after three years? To answer this question, I read the annual 
report of the CEO’s fourth year. If the CEO is in this annual report, then there is no need 
to search for the CEO’s leaving date. Otherwise, the leaving date can be found using the 
firm’s NZX announcements and annual reports. These sources sometimes fail so I also 
use Google and Factiva. When the leaving date cannot be found it is set equal to the 
replacement CEO’s starting date. The above procedure is also used to find the CEO’s 
leaving announcement. When the leaving announcement date cannot be found it is set 
equal to the earlier of the following: the CEO’s leaving date or the replacement CEO’s 
appointment announcement.   
(b) Is the firm still listed on the NZX after three years? I answer this question by reading the 
firm’s most recent NZX announcements. These announcements also give the firm’s 
reason for delisting. 
(c) What is the CEO’s starting date? This question is answered by reading the CEO’s 
appointment announcement and the firm’s annual report of the appointment year. 
When the starting date cannot be found it is set equal to the CEO’s appointment 
announcement date. 
(ii) The                data is collected as follows. On the NZX Company Research database, I 
input the stock ticker in the top right-hand corner search box and click ‘Search’. On the left-
hand side of the uploaded webpage, I click ‘Annual Report Financials’, which gives the firm’s 
historical financial statements. The SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY row contains the relevant book 
equity figures.52,53 Two figures are copied for each of                       and 
                , so that weighted averages can be taken. Sometimes this process fails, so I 
also use annual reports. 
(iii) The                          data is collected as follows. On the NZX Company Research 
database, I go to the Adjusted Share Price Tool section, input the stock ticker, leave the date 
range, and click ‘Go’. A spreadsheet is downloaded, containing a time series of the firm’s 
                                                             
52
 These figures exclude convertible securities, subordinated debt, and minority interests. 
53 One firm (two appointments) reports its book value figures in US dollars (USD), so I convert these figures to 
NZ dollars (NZD) using the USD / NZD exchange rate at the respective balance dates. Exchange rate data is 
available from http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/tables/b1/. 
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share price, market capitalisation, and other trading statistics. The Market Capitalisation 
column - which contains a time series of the firm’s daily closing market capitalisations - 
contains the required figures for                                and 
                          . After copying these figures into my spreadsheet, I divide them 
by 1000 so that their units are consistent with those of               . 
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A.5 Data Collection for Control Variables 
 
SIZE’s data is collected as follows: (a) on the NZX Company Research database, input the stock ticker 
in the top right-hand corner search box and click ‘Search’; (b) on the left-hand side of the uploaded 
webpage, click ‘Annual Report Financials’; and (c) scroll down to the TOTAL ASSETS row and copy the 
two required figures for the weighted average. Sometimes this process fails, so I also use annual 
reports.  
 
INDUSTRY’s data is collected as follows: (a) on the NZX Company Research database, input the stock 
ticker in the top right-hand corner search box and click ‘Search’; (b) on the left-hand side of the 
uploaded webpage, click ‘Directory’; and (c) note the firm’s NZX Group Sector. The NZX Group Sector 
gives the firm’s industry at present or at the firm’s delisting date, whereas INDUSTRY measures the 
firm’s industry at the appointment announcement date; so when it is unclear whether the firm’s 
industry has changed or not, I read the firm’s annual report of the appointment year. Sometimes (a) 
through (c) fails, so I rely solely on annual reports to infer the firm’s industry. This manual 
classification is done for firms with no NZX Group Sector information, for firms listed on the NZAX 
because such firms are not classified under the six broad NZX industry groups, and for a firm that has 
an Overseas (No Index) classification despite being domiciled in NZ. 
 
PRIOR uses share prices and the collection of this data is described in Appendix A.3. For seven 
appointments, I cannot measure the whole 12-month return because the firms list within this time. 
For six of these appointments, I calculate PRIOR over a reduced period (at least 50 trading days). For 
the remaining appointment (an outsider), I do not calculate PRIOR as I deem the period too short 
(less than 20 trading days).  
 
EXCESS_MTB uses             and INDUSTRY and the data collection for these variables is described 
above. I cannot measure EXCESS_MTB for one appointment (an outsider) because its 
                             data is missing. 
 
MARKET uses share prices and the collection of this data is described in Appendix A.3. MARKET also 
uses CPI data, which is available from http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/tables/m1/.  
 
REGULATED is created by Glenn Boyle.  
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PERIOD uses the CEO’s start date and the collection of this date is described in Appendix A.4.  
 
BOARD_DEP is from Sarah Hargreaves’ Honours Dissertation. Hargreaves (2013) explains the data 
collection process as follows: 
 
To determine the number of insider directors I look at the appointing firm’s 
annual report for the period in which a CEO announcement takes place. In 
most recently published annual reports companies state whether directors are 
executive or non-executive directors. If this information is not provided I 
reconcile the list of directors provided in the company directory against the list 
of company executives; insider directors are those who appear in both lists. 
(p.16) 
 
AB_RETURN uses share prices and the collection of this data is described in Appendix A.3. 
 
EXCESS_PAY uses SIZE and INDUSTRY and the data collection for these variables is described above. 
EXCESS_PAY also uses PAY and the definition and data collection for this variable are described 
below.  
 
PAY has the following characteristics: 
 PAY is the CEO’s initial remuneration. Ideally, I use the CEO’s first year remuneration so that 
PAY is not endogenous with CEO performance. However, as I explain later, sometimes I am 
forced to use the CEO’s second year remuneration. 
 PAY includes cash remuneration (i.e., cash salary, cash bonus, and valued benefits), but 
excludes equity remuneration (i.e., shares and options).54 I exclude equity remuneration so 
that the measurement of PAY is consistent across all CEOs; sometimes the CEO’s equity 
remuneration cannot be measured because firms do not state its dollar amount.  
 PAY is measured in real dollars. The CEO’s remuneration is converted to June 2012 dollars 
using the CPI.  
 
Within an annual report there are two sources of PAY information: Directors’ Remuneration and 
Employees’ Remuneration. The Directors’ Remuneration source gives the exact remuneration of the 
                                                             
54 One CEO is paid secondment fees which I deem to be cash remuneration. Two CEOs are paid in USD so I 
convert their remunerations to NZD.  
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directors of the firm; and the Employees’ Remuneration source lists the number of employees 
whose remuneration lies in $10,000 bands over $100,000 (i.e., the number of employees whose 
remuneration lies between $100,000 and $110,000, between NZ$110,000 and NZ$120,000, and so 
on); and the Employees’ Remuneration source generally does not count executive directors. Using 
these sources, I collect PAY’s data as follows:  
(i) If the CEO is a director, then I use the Directors’ Remuneration source. The year of the 
annual report is chosen using the following criteria: 
a. If the CEO becomes a director upon CEO appointment, then I use the annual report 
of the appointment year. The stated remuneration is often for a fraction of a year, 
so it is scaled up to an annual amount.55   
b. If the CEO is a director before becoming CEO, then I use the annual report of the 
CEO’s first full financial year in charge. For example, if the CEO starts in March 2004 
and the firm’s balance date is June 2004, then I use the June 2005 annual report. 
Even though this choice of annual report does not strictly measure the CEO’s initial 
remuneration and hence may be slightly endogenous with CEO performance, it 
isolates the CEO’s remuneration from his previous directorship remuneration. 
(ii) If the CEO is not a director, then I use the Employees’ Remuneration source.56 Following 
Andjelkovic, Boyle, and McNoe (2002), I use the middle of the highest salary band as a proxy 
for the CEO’s remuneration. For example, if the highest salary band is $450,000 to $460,000, 
then I assume the CEO’s remuneration is $455,000.57 I use the annual report of the CEO’s 
first full financial year. Even though this choice of annual report does not strictly measure 
the CEO’s initial remuneration, it isolates the CEO’s remuneration from the previous CEO’s 
remuneration. It also ensures that a whole year of remuneration is captured by the salary 
band.   
 
Unfortunately, PAY data is not available in the following circumstances:  
                                                             
55 I annualise with the following formula: 
                   
(                                           )    
 .  
56 In recent years, some firms disclose their CEO’s exact remuneration even though the CEO is not a director. 
For these cases, I use the exact disclosed amount rather than the Employees’ Remuneration source.  
57
 For two appointments, I use the second highest salary band rather than the highest. For the first 
appointment, the highest salary band has one employee in it and he receives severance pay. This employee 
cannot be the CEO as the CEO is still at the firm. For the second appointment, the highest salary band has one 
employee in it and he is an executive director. This employee cannot be the CEO as the CEO is not a director.     
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 As explained above, in some cases the CEO needs to be in charge for a full financial year. This 
requirement is not met for 15 appointments (2 insiders, a grey insider, and 12 outsiders).  
 Sometimes a CEO’s remuneration is not given in an annual report or is given ambiguously. 
Property trusts do not seem to disclose CEO remuneration, while other firms just state that 
remuneration is paid through a management company, or there is an arrangement with the 
parent, or x employees earned at least $y. I can sometimes get around this ambiguity by 
looking at subsequent annual reports with clearer figures. This lack of data affects 13 more 
appointments (2 insiders, 6 grey insiders, and 5 outsiders).  
 If the appointment date was pre 1996, then CEO remuneration data is generally 
unavailable.58 Firms have only been required to disclose director and employee 
remuneration since 1 July 1997, and most firms did not voluntarily disclose before this date. 
This lack of data affects 12 more appointments (an insider, 3 grey insiders, and 8 outsiders). 
 There is no annual report as the firm is subsequently delisted.59 This situation affects 11 
appointments (2 insiders, 7 grey insiders, and 2 outsiders).  
 As explained above, cash and equity remuneration needs to be broken out. This does not 
happen for one appointment (an outsider).  
Overall, PAY data is not available for 52 appointments (7 insiders, 17 grey insiders, and 28 outsiders). 
 
                                                             
58 Only two pre 1996 appointments have CEO remuneration data.  
59 For one appointment, I can find the relevant annual report on the NZ Companies Office website. 
